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No. 20170318-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JEREMY BOWDEN,
Defendant/Appellant.
__________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 2015, someone shot at an officer. Witnesses gave varied
descriptions of the shooter. Officers arrested Jeremy Bowden, who had run from
a stolen truck, wearing clothing common to men in the area: jeans, a black jacket,
and a bandana. In his pocket was an unfired bullet of a larger caliber than the
bullets fired at the officer.
On appeal, Bowden first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
Witnesses’ descriptions of the shooter were too inconsistent to support a
reasonable identification of Bowden. Evidence of his presence, his flight from
officers, and his access to larger firearms and ammunition provided only a basis
for speculation as to his involvement in the shooting. This Court should vacate
Bowden’s attempted murder conviction and the obstructing justice conviction.

Second, Bowden challenges the trial court’s decision to admit evidence of
the unfired bullet in his pocket. Having the larger bullet in his pocket did not
make Bowden more likely to have shot smaller bullets. Admission of this
irrelevant evidence requires reversal.
Third, Bowden challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to merge the
felony discharge of firearm convictions with the attempted aggravated murder
conviction. The State charged Bowden with five counts of felony discharge of a
firearm. The State could not have presented its case for attempted aggravated
murder without evidence of the firearm discharges. While the trial court agreed
to merge one count, the trial court should have merged all five with the attempted
aggravated murder conviction. This Court should remand for resentencing.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue I: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence of attempted
aggravated murder, where identification descriptions were too inconsistent to
support a reasonable identification of Bowden.
Standard of Review: “When a defendant challenges a jury verdict for
insufficiency of the evidence, ‘[this Court] review[s] the evidence and all
inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to
the verdict.’” State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187,¶4, 283 P.3d 543. This Court “will
reverse the jury’s verdict ‘only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
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entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted.’” Id.
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel’s directed verdict
motion made at the close of the State’s case. R1224-26; Addendum C. But to the
extent this Court believes the issue is not preserved, it should review the issue for
plain error. See State v. Mohamed, 2012 UT App 183,¶3, 282 P.3d 1066 (per
curiam). “When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under the plain error
doctrine, ‘a defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient
to support a conviction of the crime charged and second that the insufficiency
was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case
to the jury.’” Id. (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,¶17, 10 P.3d 346).
Issue II: Whether the trial court erred in allowing irrelevant and prejudicial
evidence that Bowden had an unfired bullet in his pocket when arrested.
Standard of Review: While the standard of review for a trial court’s
relevance and prejudice determinations is abuse of discretion, the standard of
review for the trial court’s interpretation of evidentiary rules is correctness. State
v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,¶¶32,35, 52 P.3d 1194; State v. Horton, 848 P.2d
708, 713 (Utah Ct. App 1993).
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel’s motion at trial.
R955-964; Addendum B. But to the extent this Court believes it is not, it should
review the issue for plain error. See State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9,¶18, 154 P.3d 788.
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Issue III: Whether the trial court erred in failing to merge four lesser
charges of felony discharge of a firearm into attempted aggravated murder.
Standard of Review: “[W]hether one crime is a lesser included offense,
which merges with a greater included offense, is a legal question of statutory
interpretation reviewed for correctness.” State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57,¶5, 122 P.3d
615.
Preservation: This issue is preserved by trial counsel’s post-trial motion.
R435-47, 1365-76; Addendum D. But to the extent this Court believes it is not, it
should review the issue for plain error. See Powell, 2007 UT 9,¶18.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Bowden with attempted aggravated murder, a first
degree felony, receiving a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, obstructing
justice, a second degree felony, five counts of discharge of a firearm, third degree
felonies, and failure to stop at the command of law enforcement, a class A
misdemeanor. R1-5,35-37. At trial, Bowden did not contest the receiving a stolen
vehicle or failing to stop at the command of law enforcement charges. R78081,1291. But Bowden unsuccessfully moved the trial court to exclude evidence
that he had been arrested carrying an unfired bullet. R955-64. Bowden also
unsuccessfully moved the trial court for a directed verdict. R1224-26. A jury
convicted Bowden as charged. R35-37,1344.
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Before sentencing, Bowden moved to merge the five counts of discharge of
a firearm with the attempted aggravated murder count. R435-47,1365-76. The
trial court merged one count of discharge of a firearm. R1376.
Bowden timely appeals. R466.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
a. The State’s Case
On October 30, 2015, around 8:00 p.m., Officer Nathan Clark received
information that a female fugitive would arrive at the Mouse Pad in Midvale.
R841-43. Clark knew the Mouse Pad, an internet gaming facility, as a location for
criminal activity and fugitives where he had previously made arrests. R843,88081. At the Mouse Pad, Clark saw a black Chevrolet truck which he suspected was
stolen. R843-47. He drove into an alley and confirmed on a website that the truck
was stolen. R847-49,873-74,881-82;State’s Exh.12. He could not see the stolen
truck from the alley. R882. If anyone exited the truck in the ten to fifteen seconds
while Clark entered the alley, Clark would not have seen that person. R882-84.
Clark parked behind the truck and checked the VIN plate. R848-49,865.
He then backed into the alley where he had a good view of the truck and called
dispatch around 8:25 p.m., requesting unmarked gang cars because his marked
police vehicle “stuck out like a sore thumb.” R849-51,873-74;State’s Exh.12. He
figured that the Mouse Pad’s foot traffic had noticed him investigating and there
was “a high likelihood” that he “had already been spotted and they knew that
police were there.” R788-89,850,876. He estimated a better likelihood of
5

apprehending someone if the people around the Mouse Pad did not notice more
police. R850.
While speaking with dispatch, Clark saw a man approach the truck.
R852,888. He dropped his microphone, saying “Never mind, I’ve got a suspect.”
R852,874,888. The falling microphone made the siren chirp. R888.
Clark got out of his car and pointed his firearm at the man, whom he
identified at trial as Bowden. R853-54. Bowden stipulated to his involvement
with the stolen truck at the Mouse Pad. R780-81,957-58. Clark ordered Bowden
to the ground. R853-54. Bowden turned, faced Clark, and ran west. R854;State’s
Exh.1. Video depicted someone running towards the Family Dollar store at
8:32:08 p.m. R1178-79;State’s Exh.191. Mouse Pad surveillance depicted other
men in and around the Mouse Pad wearing similar clothing, including a second
man with white shoes, dark pants, a hoodie, and a white cap. State’s Exh.12, See
also R1311. Clark radioed that he was chasing a white male who was in his thirties
and wearing blue jeans, a black leather jacket or shirt, and a black bandana on his
head. R855,885. He stopped and radioed that the man ran west through the Easy
Pawn parking lot, towards Family Dollar. R855-56.
Around 8:30 p.m., Officer Tsouras, in his marked police car, heard Clark
talking to dispatch. R787-88. Tsouras drove toward the Mouse Pad, parking in a
nearby lot where he could see the black truck. R789-90,792-93. Hearing Clark
notify dispatch of a male approaching the black truck, Tsouras turned on his
overhead lights and drove toward the Mouse Pad. R793-94. As he drove east on
6

7200 South, Tsouras heard Clark describe a white male, wearing a white
bandana, black jacket, and blue jeans, running west toward Easy Pawn.
R794,825. Seconds later, Tsouras saw a male “matching the description,” running
west in front of Family Dollar. R795-96,834-37. This man wore a bandana or
something similar with white in it, a black jacket, blue jeans, off-white or possibly
yellowish shoes. R797,825. The man ran to the end of the walkway in front of
Family Dollar and onto the sidewalk along 7200 South. R797. In the Family
Dollar lot, Tsouras considered but decided against a foot chase. R798,821-22.
Also in the Family Dollar lot, a Family Dollar manager saw a man run past
her from behind Easy Pawn. R1191-92. He brushed her shoulder, yelling. R119295. She described him as white, “angled” eyes “like [a] wolf’s,” a pointed nose, a
dark green or khaki jacket, dark pants, dark shoes, and a dark hat. R11981200,1202-03. He was at least as tall as Bowden’s lawyer 1. R1201. She saw a
police vehicle appear almost immediately after. R1196-97,1203. The man ran into
the Les Schwab parking lot. R1197.
A bystander in a taco restaurant drive-through line across 7200 South saw
a police car speed east and then a man in jeans and a light colored jacket run

Bowden stood next to his defense counsel so the jury could see their relative
heights. R1227-8,1230. See In re J.A. and C.A., 2017 UT App 227, ¶30, n.5
(noting that in reviewing denial of a motion to dismiss, the Court of Appeals may
review evidence contained in the record as a whole when a defendant introduces
evidence after denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss). While the record does
not specify who was taller, context indicates that Bowden was shorter than his
lawyer. Cf. Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (excusing trial counsel from stating specific
ground for evidentiary ruling when such is “apparent from the context”).
1
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west, both on 7200 South. R935-41,953-54. Initially, he thought the man had no
hat but said he might have had a hat. R951,953. A police car with lights and sirens
then blocked the bystander’s view. R940-41.
Tsouras saw the man run from the Family Dollar lot northwest through the
Les Schwab lot. R799-800. In the Les Schwab lot, Tsouras tried to cut him off.
R800. The man shot at Tsouras. R801-02,827. Bullets punctured Tsouras’s car’s
window, left front headrest, laptop, and printer. R1057-1060,1073,1080-93,109799;State’s Exh.80-90,95-96,99-119. He later found a bullet in his bulletproof vest
and a matching hole in his shirt. R816-18,1165-71;State’s Exh.123-25,130-141,15657.The Family Dollar manager and taco line bystander also heard gunshots.
R941-42,944-46,1198.
An off-duty trooper, O’Gwin, arrived at the Les Schwab lot in time to see a
male wearing a dark hoodie, blue jeans, and white shoes running west while
shooting. R1210-12,1222-23. O’Gwin got out of his car, drew his weapon, ordered
the man to the ground, and even fired at him, but the man continued northwest,
shooting. R1212-13. The man disappeared behind a dumpster, shot at O’Gwin,
and disappeared over a wall. R1213-16,1221-22;State’s Exh.147,150.
Tsouras drove to a gate where he saw “a male matching the description of
the person who shot at me. . .” R806-07. The male wore “the same type of
headgear, . . . black jacket and blue jeans” as the shooter. R808,830. The
bandana, with “matching white” in it, “matched the description” he had received
from Clark. R830. Tsouras yelled, “Police, show me your hands.” R808. When
8

the man, who had a black object in his hand, did not respond, Tsouras shot him.
R808-09. The man denied having a gun and pointed to his car. R809. Tsouras
realized the man had been reaching for his keys. R809. When Clark arrived, Clark
and Tsouras argued over whether the man Tsouras shot was the same man who
had shot at Tsouras. R809-10,863. Tsouras did not know the man who shot at
him and made no other identification of the shooter. R827.
Tsouras agreed that the man who shot at him could have been a different
fugitive running from the Mouse Pad area after seeing Clark’s vehicle. R823-24.
He agreed it was possible that Bowden, fleeing from Clark, hid behind one of the
parked cars. R822-24. Businesses were open and there was foot-traffic and
pedestrians. R822. Tsouras did not remember seeing any doors closing but
agreed it was possible that the man he chased had exited from a store or from
elsewhere. R822-24. The Family Dollar store manager pointed out dumpsters in
the Easy Pawn and Family Dollar parking lots where someone could have hidden.
R1200-01;State’s Exh.146. The State’s Exhibits additionally depict buildings,
vehicles, and shrubbery. State’s Exh.1-2.
At least thirty officers set up a “containment,” monitoring persons coming
into and leaving the area. R901,903,1160-62. Participants activated their police
cars’ lights during the containment. R1002-03. Officers Franchow, Walser, and
Lechuga assisted. R966-68,988,991,998-99. Franchow said the description of the
man they sought was “very vague,” a bald white male wearing a jacket. R972,984.
Lechuga was told to watch for a male wearing a black shirt and black pants.
9

R991,994-95. Walser was told to watch for a white male adult, medium height,
bald. R1000.
Franchow and Lechuga waited by a high fence. R966-71,988,991. After ten
to fifteen minutes, Franchow saw a male jump over the fence, about 100 feet in
front of him. R972. Defense counsel conceded at trial that Bowden jumped over
the fence and ran from officers. R990,1311. Bowden wore a maroon or red t-shirt
and jeans and appeared to be bald. R973,981,984,1163-64,1185-86;State’s
Exh.120. Franchow and Lechuga chased, tased, and arrested Bowden at 8:55 p.m.
R973-94,1158-60,1162,1311. Walser found an unfired bullet in Bowden’s pocket.
R1001-02,1157-58,1185. Officers called off containment sixteen to twenty minutes
later. R1185,1187-88.
Officer Stilson and a canine officer with a dog searched the area during and
after the containment. R899,901-05,907-13. On top of a covered parking area, on
the other side of the Les Schwab wall, Stilton found a gun and an ejected
magazine. R910-13;State’s Exh.144. A crime scene technician identified the gun
as a 9 mm Ruger. R1064. Technicians identified the 9 mm casings fired at
Tsouras as being from the Ruger. R1046-48,1052,1056-60,1070-73. Bowden
stipulated that the Ruger was the gun that fired at Tsouras. R1068-69. A 9 mm
gun is a common weapon that Tsouras had previously seen suspects possess.
R829. No dark jacket, bandana, or hat was ever found. R1188-89,1160-61. One of
the 9 mm casings of the bullet’s shot at Tsouras was stamped “RP,” a Remington
brand. R1052,1147-48.
10

Officers searched the stolen truck. R1101-17. Bowden stipulated that an
Ipad and a government document found in the truck belonged to him. R110406;State’s Exh.73,160. The truck also contained gun parts, rifles, shotguns, a
pellet gun, ammunition, and casings. R1106-17,1136-40;State’s Exh.160-89. One
unfired 9 mm round was an “RP,” while three others were Federals. R1148.
Remington and Federal are common, well-known manufacturers of ammunition.
R1180-81. The owner of the stolen truck owned some but not all of the guns and
ammunition. R1120-1130. He had never owned a 9 mm gun or ammunition.
R1130. The bullet found in Bowden’s pocket was Federal which is larger than a 9
mm and could not have fit into the Ruger. R1158,1181-82.
The Utah State Crime Lab performed DNA analysis. R916-22,924-25. This
excluded Bowden as the source of DNA on the ejected magazine but was
otherwise inconclusive. R923-26.
b. Bowden’s motion to exclude evidence about the unfired bullet in
his pocket.
During trial, Bowden’s counsel moved to exclude evidence that Bowden
had an unfired bullet in his pocket when he was arrested. R955-64. Defense
counsel argued that the evidence was irrelevant more prejudicial than probative
because it could not have fit into the gun that shot at Tsouras. R955,961. The
State argued that the evidence was admissible because someone caught carrying
an unfired bullet is comfortable with firearms and is therefore more likely to have
shot at an officer. R956-57,960-62. The State also argued that in light of
Bowden’s admitted connection to the truck with the firearms and ammunition,
11

the bullet was not particularly prejudicial. R962-64. The trial court agreed with
the State. R963-64.
c. Bowden’s Motion for Directed Verdict
At the conclusion of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for a directed
verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence. R1224-1226. Defense counsel agreed
that Clark had identified Bowden as the man he saw at the Mouse Pad, but
argued that the descriptions of the man seen running and firing at Tsouras were
“inconsistent at best” and insufficient to prove that Bowden was the one who shot
at Tsouras. R1225. The trial court acknowledged inconsistencies but ruled that
given the time each witness had to observe, there was still sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to convict Bowden. R1226.
d. Merger.
Prior to sentencing, Bowden’s counsel timely moved the trial court to
merge Bowden’s convictions for discharge of a firearm with attempted aggravated
murder, arguing that the facts proving the five counts of discharge of a firearm
were the same or fewer than the facts proving attempted murder. R435-47,482491,1365-69,1371-73,1375. The State argued that all shots merited charges but
agreed to merge one count of discharge into the attempted aggravated murder.
R448-51,1369-71,1373-76. The trial court merged one count of discharge and
otherwise denied Bowden’s motion. R1375-76.
The trial court sentenced Bowden to five years to life on Count 1, one to
fifteen years on counts 2 and 3, and mandatory three to five year terms on the
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remaining four counts of discharge of a firearm. R462-63,1394-97, Addendum A.
Counts 1-3 were to run consecutive to each other. R463,1394-97, Addendum A.
Counts 4-7 were to run concurrent to each other and concurrent to other counts.
R463,1394-97, Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, there was insufficient evidence to convict Bowden of attempted
aggravated murder. Utah courts have found circumstantial evidence sufficient for
identification when the evidence identifies a defendant. Here, inconsistent
descriptions raise only the possibility that police arrested the right man.
Second, the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting evidence of Bowden
having a large bullet in his pocket when arrested. The evidence was irrelevant as
to whether Bowden committed the shooting and any probative value of the
evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Finally, all of the discharge of firearm convictions should have merged with
attempted aggravated murder. Facts used to convict Bowden for unlawful
discharge were the same or less than the facts required to convict Bowden for
attempted aggravated murder.
ARGUMENT
I.

The evidence was insufficient to identify Bowden as the man
who shot at Tsouras.
The State presented insufficient evidence that Bowden is the person that

shot at Tsouras. This Court will “reverse the jury’s verdict in a criminal case
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when” it concludes “as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to
warrant conviction.” State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,¶10, 2 P.3d 954
(internal quotation marks omitted). It will “view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict,” and reverse “if the evidence is so inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable
doubt that the defendant committed the crime.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Although the burden of establishing insufficiency “is high, it is not
impossible.” Id. This Court “will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the
evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[t]o affirm the
jury’s verdict,” this Court “must be sure the State has introduced evidence
sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In the absence of direct evidence, circumstantial evidence must support
reasonable inferences, “not mere speculation.” State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App
228,¶10, 238 P.3d 1096. In Cristobal this Court considered whether an
unidentified male’s presence and subsequent flight from the scene of the
defendant’s graffiti crime sufficiently illustrated that male’s involvement for the
defendant’s conviction to be eligible for Group Crime Enhancement. Id. ¶¶9-15. A
reasonable inference “is a conclusion reached by considering other facts and
deducing a logical consequence from them.” Id. ¶16 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “When evidence supports only one possible conclusion, the quality of
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the inference rests on the reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from
the proven facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
With speculation, however, “the evidence supports more than one possible
conclusion.” Id. “[S]peculation is the act or practice of theorizing about matters
over which there is no certain knowledge at hand.” Salt Lake City v. Carrera,
2015 UT 73,¶12 358 P.3d 1067, (internal quotation marks omitted). In Carrera,
which involved possession of a social security card, the defendant’s knowledge
that the card’s owner did not give the defendant permission to have the card
insufficiently supported an inference that the defendant possessed the card with
nefarious intent. Id. ¶¶1,4,7,9. “[J]ury verdicts decided on the basis of remote or
speculative possibilities of guilt are invalid.” Id. ¶11 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To establish sufficient evidence of attempted aggravated murder, the State
had to present evidence from which the jury could draw reasonable inferences
that Bowden intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of peace
officer attempting to make an arrest. UTAH CODE §§ 76-5-202(f) and 76-4101;R402. Identity is an element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Neilson, 2017 UT App 7,¶21, 391 P.3d 398.
In Neilson, where the victim had lived in the defendant’s house and
described her father’s friend “Don,” identification was easily proven. Neilson,
2017 UT App 7,¶22. “[I]dentification can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court similarly found
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circumstantial evidence sufficient for identification in State v. Andersen, 2003
UT App 50. In Andersen, the victim described the man who robbed him as
wearing blue jeans, a light colored t-shirt, and a blue bandana. Id. *1. The victim
described his attacker as working with an accomplice, a female prostitute who
solicited the victim while the attacker took the victim’s wallet, hit him on the
head, and ran. Id. The wallet contained approximately $100 in smaller
denominations. Id. Immediately after the robbery, officers saw the defendant
pass a stolen Blazer while the officers spoke with the accomplice. Id. Shortly after,
officers witnessed the defendant feigning sleep in the Blazer. Id. Officers pulled
the defendant off a fence as he tried to flee. Id. On the other side of the fence they
found a wad of cash in smaller denominations. Id. Although the defendant wore a
multi-colored striped polo shirt, descriptions of the robber’s clothing, his
association with the accomplice near the Blazer, and the proceeds of the crime,
together sufficed to identify the defendant as the robber. Id. **1 n.1 and 3.
Mere presence at a crime scene may establish a defendant’s guilt only if
presence, considered with the surrounding circumstances, supports a reasonable
inference of participation in the crime. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶¶17-18.
In Cristobal this Court considered that the unidentified male’s presence, his
proximity to the defendant and the graffiti, and the strong odor of paint, created a
reasonable inference of knowledge of the criminal activity. Id. ¶17. But, while the
unidentified man’s guilt could “reasonably be inferred,” it was “equally
reasonable that he was merely present during the crime.” Id. His presence and
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proximity did not create a reasonable inference that he had aided or encouraged
commission of the crime. Id. ¶21.
One common factor in circumstantial identification cases is a defendant’s
lone presence at a crime scene. For example, in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839,
851 (Utah 1988), evidence was circumstantial regarding who fatally struck a
child. Id. The medical examiner testified that the fatal injury most likely
happened twelve hours before death. Id. at 841. The defendant was the only adult
in the home twelve hours before the child’s death. Id. Thus, sufficient
circumstantial evidence identified the defendant as the person who struck the
child. Id.
Similarly, in State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,345-46 (Utah 1997), 2 sufficient
circumstantial evidence linked the defendant to the murder where (1) only she
and the victim had keys to his house; (2) she was unable to prove her
whereabouts during the time a neighbor heard “pops” that the neighbor believed
were gunshots; (3) the victim had received bank statements informing him of the
defendant forging his checks; (4) the only items stolen from the victim’s home
were his wallet, handgun, and financial records; and (5) she gave inconsistent
statements as to why she left soup on his porch. The Utah Supreme Court
emphasized that only the victim and defendant had keys to the victim’s house in

In a successful PCRA action the defendant established her alibi and presented
evidence that others had access to the victim’s house. Brown v. State, 2013 UT
42, ¶¶15-17, 308 P.3d 486.

2
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finding it reasonable for the jury to have inferred the defendant was the
murderer. Id.
Likewise, in State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1998),
circumstantial evidence identified the defendant as having special access to the
crime scene. In Lyman, the defendant, who was primarily responsible for
maintenance and cleaning, was the only person seen in the maintenance closet on
the day surveillance equipment was stolen. Id. He was seen carrying a bucket of
spackle. Id. He had borrowed a putty knife. Id. He had left the premises twice
although he told detectives he had neither entered the closet nor left that day. Id.
There was a new hole in the closet, covered by damp spackle. Id. This Court held
that sufficient circumstantial evidence identified the defendant. Id.
Like mere presence, flight from a crime scene is insufficient to prove
identification. Flight, even “immediately following commission of a crime” “is
merely a circumstance to be considered with other factors as tending to show a
consciousness of guilt and therefore guilt itself.” Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶14
(internal quotation marks omitted). In Cristobal, “it [could] reasonably be
inferred that the unidentified male’s flight from the scene of the crime was due to
a guilty conscience.” Id. ¶17. However, this Court deemed it equally reasonable
that the unidentified man fled out of fear of being perceived as having
participated in the defendant’s crime. Id. Similarly, in Salt Lake City v. Gallegos,
2015 UT App 78,¶¶7-10, 347 P.3d 842, the defendant’s flight plus clothing and
scrapes gave rise to no more than speculation that the defendant had been
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involved in a crime. Id. ¶10. “[A] further step is required,” to conclude that flight
stemmed from criminality. Id. “[T]here must be evidence separate from flight
itself from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt” a defendant’s
motivation for flight. Id. ¶8.
Circumstantial physical evidence supplements presence and flight evidence
where the physical evidence connects the defendant to the crime. For example, in
State v. Harris, 2015 UT App 282,¶¶4,7,14-18, 363 P.3d 555, officers responding
to a store’s security alarm caught the defendant fleeing, alone, from where he had
been crouched behind the store’s outdoor planter box. Officers found stolen items
and burglary tools near the planter box. Id. ¶5. In the defendant’s pocket was a
shard of glass which “matched the thickness and hue” of the store’s broken glass.
Id. Evidence of the shard, which was “consistent with both the violent manner in
which the glass was broken and the way the glass fell outward,” supported
reasonable inferences that “the defendant was standing next to the glass door
when it was broken.” Id. ¶¶13. “Because these inferences support a conclusion
that one possibility is more probable than another . . . the inferences are
reasonable and not speculative.” Id. ¶14, (quoting State v. Cristobal, 2014 UT
App 55,¶7, 322 P.3d 1170).
Circumstantial physical evidence can identify a gun’s shooter. In State v.
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,¶¶9,29, 973 P.2d 404, where the issue was whether the
victim’s shooting death was a homicide or a suicide, an expert testified that “he
would expect to find gunshot residue on the hands of anyone who fired this gun.”
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Id. ¶¶35-36. Gunshot residue on the defendant’s hands identified the defendant
as the one to have fired the gun. Id. ¶¶35-37.
In this case, the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to identify
Bowden as the person who shot at Tsouras. A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of evidence to support a verdict should marshal the evidence “as a
natural extension of an appellant’s burden of persuasion.” State v. Nielsen, 2014
UT 10,¶¶40-41, 326 P.3d 645; see also Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(8) advisory
committee’s note.
The marshaled evidence indicating Bowden’s identity as the person who
shot at Tsouras, in the light most favorable to the verdict, is the following:
1. Bowden was seen approaching the stolen truck at the Mouse Pad.
R780-82,852,957-59,1183. He had possessions in the truck. R110406;State’s Exh.73.
2. When Clark approached Bowden at the Mouse Pad, Bowden ran
west, through the Easy Pawn lot towards Family Dollar.
R852,856,872-77,1178-79.
3. Clark described Bowden as a “white male in about his thirties
wearing blue jeans,” a black leather jacket or shirt, and a bandana.
R855.
4. Three to five seconds after hearing Clark’s description, Tsouras saw a
man running west on the front walkway of Family Dollar. R795-96.
The person he saw wore a black jacket, blue jeans, and “some type of
headgear.” R796-98.
5. A series of shots were fired at Tsouras. R804,828,85859,879,942,945,1047-52,1095-96,1147-48,1198,1212-14.
6. The Family Dollar manager saw a white male who ran by her,
immediately before she saw a police car. The man wore a dark jacket,
dark pants, and a hat. R1198-99,1202-03. His eyes and nose could
have corresponded to photos of Bowden from the Mouse Pad. R11981201;State’s Exh.151. She saw the man run into the Les Schwab
parking lot and then heard gunshots. R1197-98.
7. Across the street, the taco line bystander line saw a man running
west along 7200 South, wearing dark jeans and a jacket, followed by
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a police car with lights and siren. R935-38,940-42,945,953-54.
Although he thought it was light-colored, the taco line bystander was
unsure about the jacket’s color. R954.
8. Clark, Tsouras, the taco line bystander, and the Family Dollar
manager each described only one man running. R796,835,85557,938-941,943,946,949,951,1192-1201.
9. O’Gwin saw the shooter wearing blue jeans in the Les Schwab lot.
R1210-12,1221,1223. His dashboard camera recorded a male in dark
pants, dark top, and light shoes, apparently shooting. State’s
Exh.148.
10. Police set up a containment that lasted until 16 minutes after
Bowden’s arrest. R901,903,1160-62,1187-88.
11. Franchow was told to watch for a bald white male wearing a jacket.
R972,984.
12. Lechuga was told to watch for a male in black shirt and black pants.
R991,994-95.
13. Walser was told to watch for a white male adult, medium height,
bald. R1000.
14. Bowden jumped over the fence and ran from officers. R972-79,99193.
15. Franchow and Lechuga arrested Bowden within the containment
area, not far from the shooting, 22 minutes after Clark radioed
dispatch that Bowden ran from the Mouse Pad. R902-04,96772,981,989,991-93,998,1160,1162-63;State’s Exh.2.
16. Bowden was the only man the Franchow encountered avoiding
officers and the only man arrested in the containment area.
R981,1006.
17. When arrested, Bowden appeared to be bald and wore blue jeans.
R973,981,984,1185-86,1163-1164;State’s Exh.120.
18. Bowden had no bandana or jacket when arrested. R985.
19. The 9 mm gun that fired the shots was found near the Les Schwab
lot. R910-12,1046-48,1052,1056-60,1068-73.
20.DNA could not exclude Bowden from having fired the 9 mm. R92326.
21. One of the 9 mm casings from bullets shot at Tsouras was of the
same brand as 9 mm ammunition found in the stolen truck.
R1052,1107,1113-14,1146-48.
22.The truck owner had never owned a 9 mm firearm or 9 mm
ammunition. R1130.
Even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
the State presented insufficient evidence that Bowden was the man who shot at
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Tsouras. See, UTAH CODE §§76-5-202, 76-4-101. Where, as here, there was an
“absence of direct evidence” the jury was required to base its verdict “upon
reasonable inference and not mere speculation.” Cristobal, 2010 UT App
228,¶10. But, the evidence in this case, Bowden’s clothing, his association with
the stolen truck, and his flight from Clark towards the area where Tsouras got
shot at and from officers after the shooting supported “more than one” equally
likely conclusion: Bowden shot at Tsouras, or a different man in the area shot at
Tsouras. See id. ¶16. Because there was nothing that made “one possibility more
probable than another,” concluding Bowden was the person that fired at Tsouras
amounted to mere “speculation.” Id.
The State’s argument in trial that only one man was seen running in the
direction that Clark said he had seen Bowden run provides only speculative
possibilities that the witnesses all described Bowden. See Carrera, 2015 UT
73,¶¶11-12;R1300-03. A similarly speculative possibility is that witnesses all
described the same man. Id.;R1300-03. As defense counsel argued, witnesses’
descriptions were “inconsistent at best.” R794-95,797,807-10,824-25,830,83435,837,855,884-85,938,941,950-54,972-73,978,981,984-85,991,99495,1000,1003,1198-1203,1210-11,1222-23,1225,1230. The inconsistencies are
more striking than the subtle differences in Andersen, where witnesses
describing the robber’s light colored t-shirt, “reasonably describe[d]” the
defendant’s striped polo shirt. See Andersen, 2003 UT App 50, n.1.
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The State presented only speculative possibilities that the inconsistent
witnesses all described Bowden. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶¶16-17. While
O’Gwin said the shooter wore a dark hoodie, Clark, Lechuga, Franchow, and
Walser never saw Bowden wearing a hoodie. R797,855,973,981,984,116364,1185-86,1210-11. While Clark described Bowden as having a black bandana,
Tsouras heard “white,” and only described white in the shooter’s bandana.
R794,797,825,855,885. The Family Dollar manager said the man who ran by her
was taller than Bowden’s counsel, but Bowden was shorter. R1201,1230.
Although close enough to have seen Bowden’s face and describe his nose and eyes
in detail, she mentioned no facial hair, possibly Bowden’s most prominent facial
feature. R1191-03;State’s Exh.120. Inconsistencies forced the jury to theorize
about “matters over which there is no certain knowledge.” See Carrera, 2015 UT
73,¶12. Far from supporting “only one possible conclusion” —that witnesses saw
Bowden, the evidence equally supported “more than one possible conclusion,”
namely that another man shot at Tsouras. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶16.
The State presented only the possibility that inconsistent witnesses all
described the same man. See Cristobal, 2010 App 228,¶¶17. As defense counsel
pointed out, others at the Mouse Pad wore clothing that would match
descriptions of the shooter. R1311-12;State’s Exh.12. While Clark assumed the
shooter was the same man he had encountered at the Mouse Pad, Tsouras
insisted his shooter was the man Tsouras shot. R808-10,863. While Clark
described Bowden as wearing a black bandana, Tsouras only described white in
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the shooter’s bandana. R794,797,825,855,885. The State characterized O’Gwin’s
video as depicting the shooter wearing light-colored shoes, but the Family Dollar
manager said the man who ran past her wore dark shoes. R1201-02,1302. The
taco line bystander saw a man running in a light-colored jacket but the Family
Dollar manager said the man who ran by her wore a dark-colored jacket. R94041,950-51,953-54,1199.
One “reasonable explanation” is that the witnesses describing light or dark
clothing all saw the same man and simply perceived or remembered colors
incorrectly. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶17. But light versus dark are not
subtle, subjective, distinctions. Cf, Andersen, 2003 UT App 50 (finding witnesses’
descriptions of a light colored t-shirt “reasonably describe[d]” defendant’s striped
polo shirt). The State presented “two equally reasonable explanations . . . under
these circumstances: either” the inconsistent witnesses inaccurately described the
same man or the witnesses saw different men wearing clothing similar to other
men in the area. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶17;R794-95,797,805-10,82425,830,834-35,837,855,884-85,938,940-41,950-54,1199,1201-02,1302;State’s
Exh.’s 12,147.
Unlike the defendants in Brown, Worthen, Lyman, and Harris, Bowden
was no more likely to be the shooter than any other man in the area. Where the
Worthen defendant could have been the only adult at home and the Brown
defendant possessed the only keys to the crime scene, the area in the instant case
was open for business. See Worthen, 765 P.2d at 851; Brown, 948 P.2d at
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345;R822,842-43,880-81. Others were present on foot in the shooting vicinity,
including a man who so closely resembled Tsouras’s shooter that Tsouras shot
him. R807-810,821-24,830. Unlike in Harris where only the defendant fled the
security alarm, the Mouse Pad was known for crime and fugitives who, warned of
police by Clark’s movements and chirping siren, had as much motive and
opportunity as Bowden to run. See Harris, 2015 UT App 282,¶11;R788-89,84853,873-74,876-77,880-84,888-89;State’s Exh.12. Unlike in Brown, Tsouras
agreed his shooter could have been someone other than Bowden, someone who
came from the same area. R796,822-24,1200-01;State’s Exh.’s 1-2. Unlike in
Brown, Worthen, Lyman, and Harris, the State did not present evidence upon
which the jury could make rational identification inferences from Bowden’s
presence or subsequent flight.
Further, unlike the Brown defendant, Bowden had no more access to a 9
mm gun than any other man. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 345. In Brown, it was
significant that the defendant could have used her keys to the victim’s house and
knowledge of where the victim stored his gun to obtain the victim’s gun and shoot
him. Id. Here, the State presented no evidence of Bowden’s means to obtain a 9
mm gun. R1130. That Bowden could somehow have obtained a 9 mm gun is “one
reasonable explanation.” See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶17. An “equally
reasonable explanation” is that another man, a Mouse Pad fugitive, possessed
and shot the 9 mm gun, which is a common gun and contained a common
ammunition brand. R829,880-81,1052,1148,1180-81.
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The State presented no physical evidence to support a reasonable inference
that Bowden possessed a 9 mm gun. Unlike in Harris, where the glass shard not
only identified the defendant as being at the crime scene but illustrated the
means of the crime, Bowden possessed nothing to indicate his having or shooting
a 9 mm gun. See Harris, 2015 UT App 282 ¶¶4,7,14-18;R1002. Unlike the Lyman
defendant, seen with the tools of his crime, Bowden was never seen with a 9 mm
gun. See Lyman, 966 P.2d at 282-83. Unlike in Andersen, where the defendant
was discarding stolen money when arrested, Bowden had nothing when arrested
to indicate involvement in shooting a 9 mm. 2003 UT App 50,*1; R1002. Unlike
in Brown, even with Bowden’s access to 9 mm ammunition in the truck, Bowden
would still have required a 9 mm gun to have shot at Tsouras. See Brown, 948
P.2d at 345;R780-81,853-54,957-59,1101-14,1130,1136-40. When arrested he had
no bullet that would fit a 9 mm. R1002,1158,1181-82. Moreover, unlike in Jaeger,
no gunshot residue or DNA indicated Bowden shot a gun. See Jaeger, 1999 UT
1,¶¶35-37;R923-26.
To the degree that fleeing demonstrated a guilty conscience, the State
presented only the possibility that Bowden’s flight stemmed from involvement in
the shooting. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶17; Gallegos, 2015 UT App 78,¶¶
7-10. Where Bowden fled from Clark prior to the shooting, it is at least as likely
that Bowden’s reason for flight from Franchow and Lechuga was his connection
to the stolen truck and his having heard gunshots. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App
228,¶17;R780-81,853-54,957-59. The “further step,” in the form of evidence
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linking Bowden’s flight to the shooting is absent here. See id.; Harris, 2015 UT
App 282,¶¶14-18.
The trial court asked the jury to speculate. Questions of whether Bowden
resembled Tsouras’s shooter required the jury to theorize “over matters over
which there is no certain knowledge.” See Carrera, 2015 UT 73,¶12. The jury’s
guilty verdict was likely “based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote
or speculative possibilities of guilt.” Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶7. The jury’s
“conclusion lies within the realm of speculation rather than reasonable
inference.” Id. ¶19 n.10. This Court should therefore vacate Bowden’s conviction
for attempted aggravated murder.
For the same reasons, this Court should also vacate Bowden’s conviction
for obstructing justice. A defendant obstructs justice if he, “with intent to hinder,
delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or
punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense. .
. (c) alters, [] conceals or removes any item or other thing.” UTAH CODE §76-8306(1);R1279-80. Obstructing justice is a second degree felony if the conduct
constituting the criminal offense is a first degree felony. UTAH CODE §76-8306(3)(a).
To prove second degree felony obstructing justice, the State needed to
provide sufficient evidence that Bowden fired the gun and then discarded it. Id.
UTAH CODE §76-5-202;R2,1279-80,1297-98. If this Court finds insufficient
evidence to prove Bowden’s identity as the shooter, then it follows that evidence
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of Bowden having been the person to have discarded the gun “with intent to
hinder, delay, or prevent” officers finding the gun is necessarily insufficient.
Where Bowden’s obstructing justice conviction necessarily depended on
sufficiency of the evidence that Bowden committed attempted aggravated
murder, the evidence was a fortiori insufficient for obstructing justice.
These issues are preserved. “[A]s a general rule, a defendant must raise the
sufficiency of the evidence by proper motion or objection to preserve the issue for
appeal.” State v. Prater, 2017 UT 13, ¶27, 392 P.3d 398 (quoting State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74,¶16). “A claim is preserved “when it has been presented to the
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on it.” Id
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Defense counsel specifically
raised the issue of whether Bowden “is, in fact, the person that fired at the officer
that day,” in his motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case.
R1224-25. Defense counsel additionally identified inconsistent descriptions of
the person who fired at Tsouras as the basis for directed verdict. R1225. This gave
the trial court the opportunity to rule on whether the State had presented
evidence sufficient to identify Bowden as the person who shot at Tsouras. This
ruling also resolved the issue of sufficiency of evidence of obstructing justice.
If, however, the Court believes this issue is not preserved, it should review
the issue for plain error. Prater, 2017 UT 13 at ¶28. “To establish plain error
[based on insufficient evidence], a defendant must demonstrate first that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime charged and second
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that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in
submitting the case to the jury.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
First, the evidence was insufficient to support Bowden’s conviction where
the evidence did not identify Bowden as the shooter. See supra Issue I,
insufficiency. While circumstantial evidence may identify a defendant, the
evidence must provide reasonable inferences, not merely grounds upon which to
theorize a defendant’s involvement in crime. See Carrera, 2015 UT 73,¶¶11-22;
see also Neilson, 2017 UT App 7,¶22. Here, Bowden’s presence in the area,
clothing, access to 9 mm ammunition, and flight from officers, established one
possibility but not a reasonable inference as to his involvement in the shooting.
See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶¶16-17,21;R780-81,853-55,885,972-94,100102,1104-14,1120-30,1136-40,1148,1158-64,1178-79,1182-86. The evidence gave
rise to speculation that Bowden shot at Tsouras but it is equally likely that
another man in the area shot at Tsouras.
Second, the insufficiency was obvious and fundamental. See Prater, 2017
UT 13,¶28. Where identification of the shooter was an essential element, it was
well-settled that the State had to present evidence supporting only one possible
conclusion, that of Bowden’s identity as the shooter. See UTAH CODE §§76-5-202;
76-4-101, Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228,¶16. Bowden’s clothing, common to men
in the area, his flight from police, and his access to ammunition, supported “more
than one possible conclusion.” See id.;R780-81,853-55,885,957-59,97294,984,1001-02,1104-14,1120-30,1136-40,1148,1158-64,1162,1163-64,117829

79,1182-86,1311;State’s Exh.12. The motion for directed verdict also helped to
make the error obvious. R1224-26. Thus, the jury verdict was based on
“impermissible speculation.” See id. ¶21.
To the degree this Court believes Bowden left unpreserved the issue of
insufficient evidence to support the obstructing justice conviction, it should
review for plain error. Prater, 2017 UT 13,¶28. First, where the evidence
insufficiently supported attempted aggravated murder, it necessarily also
insufficiently supported obstructing justice. UTAH CODE §76-5-202. Second, the
insufficiency was obvious. See Prater, 2017 UT 13,¶28. “An example of an
obvious and fundamental insufficiency is ‘the case in which the State presents no
evidence to support an essential element of a criminal charge.’” Id. (quoting
Holgate, 2000 UT 74,¶17). An essential element of obstructing justice is that the
actor’s conduct is with intent “to hinder, delay, or prevent” investigation
“regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense.” UTAH CODE §76-8-306(1).
Absent sufficient evidence identifying Bowden as the shooter, no evidence
identifies Bowden as the person who concealed the 9 mm gun. R899-915,92326,1064,1068-73.
II.

The trial court erred by admitting irrelevant evidence that
Bowden had an unfired Federal cartridge in his pocket when
arrested.
Evidence that Bowden possessed an unfired cartridge when arrested

should have been excluded under Rules 401, 402, and 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. First, evidence of the unfired bullet was irrelevant and therefore
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inadmissible under Rules 401 and 402. Second, its potential for unfair prejudice
outweighed its relevance under Rule 403. Third, reversal is required because
there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome, absent the
evidence of the bullet in Bowden’s pocket. Finally, the issue is preserved but can
also be reviewed for plain error.
A.

Evidence of the unfired bullet in Bowden’s pocket was irrelevant and
inadmissible.

Rule 402 provides that “[r]elevant evidence is admissible” and “[i]rrelevant
evidence is inadmissible.” Rule 401 defines relevant evidence.
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
“Relevance is a low bar.” State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9,¶61, 391 P.3d 1016.
In Thornton, which involved rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse, the defendant
argued that evidence of his providing the child victim’s mother with cocaine and
encouraging her to prostitute herself was irrelevant and violated Rule 404(b). Id.
¶¶ 2,7,16-19,27-30,35-36,61. The Utah Supreme Court upheld admission of the
prior acts as relevant to the prosecution’s narrative to explain the defendant’s
position of power in the household and the victim’s behavior. Id. ¶¶18,61.
Evidence concerning a defendant’s knowledge or intent must be relevant to
be admissible. In State v. Vigil, 922 P.2d 15,18-22,27 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), in a
theft by deception trial, the defendant had accepted funds from three prospective
families who wished to adopt his baby. The defendant attempted to introduce
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evidence concerning services that licensed adoption agencies provide. Id. at 27.
The defendant argued that the evidence would have demonstrated that the
attorneys facilitating two of the three prospective adoptions provided
incompetent adoption services. Id. The defendant argued that the incompetent
adoption attorneys caused his deceptive behavior because with competent
adoption services, he would have acted differently. Id. This Court said it was not
only speculative but “wholly irrelevant what defendant ‘may’ have done under
different circumstances . . . .” Id.
Utah courts find evidence of a defendant’s access to weapons relevant
where the evidence demonstrates how the defendant used the weapon to commit
a crime. For example, in State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45,¶¶10,19,58,67, 349 P.3d 712,
evidence that the defendant had a stolen assault rifle in his car when arrested had
the relevant purpose of linking the defendant to the murder weapon. In Reece,
the owner of the stolen rifle testified that the rifle was stolen along with a 9 mm
Beretta. Id. ¶58. The defendant testified “that he could not have committed the
murder because he did not even have access to a Beretta when the victim was
killed.” Id. Police never recovered the murder weapon. Id. ¶70. Evidence of the
stolen rifle had “at least some ‘tendency’ to make it more probable that [the
defendant] had access” to the Beretta, the murder weapon. Id. ¶¶66-67. The
evidence of the stolen rifle was relevant to identify the defendant as the person
who shot the victim using the stolen Beretta. Id. ¶68.
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Analogously, in State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ¶¶11,18-19, 32-33, 52
P.3d 1194, evidence of a defendant using whips and straps in consensual sexual
activity was deemed relevant. Fedorowicz involved felony murder, child abuse,
and child sexual abuse. Id. ¶1. As part of the State’s burden to demonstrate a
noncharacter purpose for the testimony under Rule 404(b), the State needed to
establish relevance. Id. ¶¶18-19,31-32. “[E]ven if otherwise relevant as defined by
rule 401, evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible under rule 402 if the evidence is
material and relevant to prove only the defendant’s proclivity to commit the
crime charged.” Id. ¶32. The evidence of the defendant using the whips and
straps was not used to show proclivity but instead to show the defendant’s
knowledge and intent to use those particular weapons to cause the victim’s
injuries. Id. ¶¶33-34,37,43.
Courts have rejected the suggestion that a defendant’s access to a weapon
is relevant, absent evidence linking the weapon to the crime charged. For
example, the District of Columbia Circuit Court in United States v. King, 254
F.3d 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001) considered whether evidence of a sheathed nine inch
knife with notched blade found in a vehicle’s trunk was relevant to demonstrate
the driver-defendant’s knowledge and intent regarding a firearm found wedged in
the back of a sunroof. Id. at 1099-1100. The Government argued to demonstrate a
noncharacter purpose for the testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
that the defendant’s possession of the knife, a weapon, was relevant to show he
possessed the gun in the same vehicle. Id. at 1101. But, the knife, even with its
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notches, had nonviolent uses and could be legally possessed. Id. The knife was
not, therefore, relevant noncharacter evidence of the defendant’s knowledge of
the gun in the sunroof. Id. Therefore, admitting evidence of the knife was error.
Id.
In Delaware, Farmer v. State, 698 A.2d 946 (Del. 1997), resembles the
instant case. Farmer involved attempted murder charges stemming from a
shooting. Id. at 947. No projectile or casings were recovered, although the size of
the entrance and exit wounds suggested the use of a small caliber firearm. Id. at
948. Police arresting the defendant found an automatic pistol in his apartment.
Id. The prosecution, while conceding it could not link the pistol to the shooting,
argued it was relevant to show the defendant’s access to a firearm that he could
have used to shoot at the victim. Id. However, without evidence linking the pistol
to the shooting, evidence of the pistol was irrelevant. Id. Moreover, “such
evidence carries the risk that the jury may associate mere ownership of a firearm
with a disposition to use it.” Id. at 949.
In the instant case the State argued that the large bullet “goes to show that
[Bowden] is familiar with weapons, that he is somehow connected to them.”
R961. The State argued that where most people do not carry unspent cartridges in
their pocket, the unspent cartridge in Bowden’s pocket tended “to show that he is
comfortable” with the cartridge. R961. The State explained that Bowden’s interest
in firearms and ammunition, in context with his access to the stolen truck
containing firearms and ammunition, demonstrated Bowden’s further comfort,
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“and if you have one [bullet],” you “have the opportunity, possibly, to use one.”
R962-963. The trial court agreed on relevance. R962.
But, evidence of the unfired bullet in Bowden’s pocket did not make more
likely any facts relevant to the instant case. A defendant’s proclivities are not
relevant. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,¶32. Someone with access to an object that
could be used as a weapon is not more likely to possess a different weapon. See
King, 254 F.3d at 1101. Ownership of a firearm is not relevant evidence of
disposition to use it. See Farmer, 698 A.2d at 949. Similarly, Bowden’s proclivity,
disposition, or comfort with having a large bullet in his pocket did not make him
more likely to have fired at Tsouras. R1002,1158,1181-82. Unlike in Fedorowicz,
no evidence of Bowden’s prior use of the larger bullet suggested Bowden’s intent
or knowledge in possessing it. See Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,¶33. Unlike in Reece,
evidence of Bowden’s possessing the large bullet did not make more likely his
having the 9 mm gun that fired at Tsouras, where the large bullet could not have
fit into a 9 mm gun. See Reece, 2015 UT 45,¶¶19,58;R1158,1181-82. The trial
court should have prohibited this irrelevant evidence under Rules 401 and 402.
B.

The potential for unfair prejudice outweighed the evidence’s
relevance.

If the evidence of the large bullet had been relevant, it should not have
been admitted because its negligible probative value was substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See Thornton, 2017 UT 9,¶62. Rule 403
allows courts to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

35

outweighed by . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Utah
R. Evid. 403.
“[U]nfair prejudice results only where the evidence has an undue tendency
to suggest decision upon an improper basis.” Reece, 2015 UT 45,¶69. For
example, in State v. Lucero, a case involving murder and child abuse, the Utah
Supreme Court considered the potential prejudicial effect of the child victim’s
prior injury. 2014 UT 15,¶¶1,33, 328 P.3d 841, abrogated on other grounds,
Thornton, 2017 UT 9,¶¶27,42,44 (holding trial courts need not conduct
“scrupulous examination” of proffered 404(b) evidence). The “danger of unfair
prejudice was . . . quite low because the prior injury was tame in comparison to
the fatal one,” meaning a low risk of the jury’s over-mastering hostility. Id. ¶35.
But, Rule 403 requires that evidence “of scant or cumulative probative force” is
not “dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” State v. Bartley,
784 P.2d 1231, 1237 (Utah Ct. App 1989) (quoting State v. Maurer, 220 P.2d 981,
984 (Utah 1989)).
In Vigil, this Court expressed concern that the offered evidence could
“confuse and/or mislead the jury.” Vigil, 922 P.2d at 28. The offered evidence,
which this Court considered speculative, would only have clouded “the real issue
before the court,” the defendant’s intent. Id. at 28. Similarly, in Farmer, the
Delaware Supreme Court considered that evidence of the defendant’s possession
of the pistol, unconnected to the shooting, presented potential for “unwarranted
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inferences.” Farmer, 698 A.2d at 949. “Speculation based on mere ownership of
instruments adaptable for use in a crime subjects the defendant to the same risk
that impermissible character or bad act evidence may pose− equating disposition
with guilt.” Id. Moreover, such speculation “creates prejudice, even apart from
the weighing process required by [Delaware Rule of Evidence] 403.” Id.
To determine whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice, courts may use the factors set forth in State v.
Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); See Lucero, 2014 UT 15,¶32. These
include inter alia, “the similarities between the crimes, . . . the need for the
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.” Shickles, 760 P.2d at
295-96.
The trial court incorrectly determined evidence of the large bullet was more
probative than prejudicial. R964. The trial court reached its decision by
considering the evidence in comparison with the effect of evidence of Bowden’s
access to firearms and ammunition in the stolen truck. R959-64. However, unlike
in Lucero, in which the Utah Supreme Court considered evidence of the prior
injuries “pretty tame,” in light of the charges themselves and where the jury could
draw inferences from the injuries, the evidence here was not “tame” in light of its
potential to mislead. See Lucero, 2014 UT 15,¶35. Possessing a large bullet is not
similar to shooting a small bullet. See Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295. The evidence
invited the jury to speculate on circumstances not in evidence, that Bowden
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possessed a 9 mm gun and shot at Tsouras. See Vigil, 922 P.2d at 27-28. The
evidence likely misled the jury by asking them to extrapolate from evidence of the
large bullet that Bowden had the disposition to shoot at Tsouras.
Bowden’s conceded access to guns and ammunition in the stolen truck is a
factor which cut against the State’s need for the evidence. See Shickles, 760 P.2d
at 295;R780-81,854,957-64,1104-14,1136-40,1146-48,1311. Where Bowden did
not contest his access to the stolen truck, the unfired bullet was unnecessary to
prove his access to the stolen truck. R780-81,854,957-59,1104-14,113640,1183,1311. Although the State is not obligated to accept a defendant’s offer to
stipulate on an issue, exclusion is still appropriate where its purpose “is
addressed to an issue that is not actually disputed . . .” Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶59;
see also State v. Verde, 2012 UT 60,¶28, 296 P.3d 673, abrogated on other
grounds, Thornton, 2017 UT 9, ¶¶27,42,44. Defense counsel conceded Bowden’s
connection to the stolen truck in his opening statement and repeatedly
throughout trial. R780-81,854,957-59,1104-14,1136-40,1183,1311;
State’s Exh.73. The State relied upon the concession in its argument that the
pocketed bullet was relevant. R956. Where Bowden’s connection to the truck was
never disputed, evidence of the bullet in his pocket was not relevant for the
alternative purpose of proving his connection to the truck.
Moreover, as “overmastering hostility,” the evidence invited the jury to
“draw unwarranted inferences.” See Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296; Farmer, 698 A.2d
at 949. Courts may exclude evidence under Rule 403 when the evidence has the
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strong propensity to confuse or mislead a jury. See Vigil, 922 P.2d at 27-28.
Bowden could not have fired the large bullet in his pocket at Tsouras.
R1002,1158,1181-82. The evidence of the unfired bullet in Bowden’s pocket
caused “overmastering hostility” by allowing the jury to infer a personal interest
in firearms from what was otherwise mere access. R780-81,854,957-59,110114,1136-40,1183,1311. Any inference that because Bowden possessed a large bullet
he was more likely to have shot at Tsouras was therefore unfairly prejudicial.
Because the above factors weighed in favor of exclusion, the evidence of Bowden
having the unspent large bullet in his pocket was unduly prejudicial and
inadmissible.
C.

The bullet evidence was prejudicial because without it, there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Bowden.

The trial court committed reversible error in admitting the evidence of the
unfired large bullet in Bowden’s pocket. This Court will reverse a verdict for
evidentiary error “if the admission of the evidence . . . reasonably” affected “the
likelihood of a different verdict.” State v. Davis, 2013 UT App 228,¶80, 311 P.3d
538. Davis involved object rape and forcible sodomy. Id. ¶1. The defendant
successfully argued that the victim’s employer’s precautionary measures, keeping
pictures of the defendant at the employer’s front desk with instructions to press
“the panic button which” rang “directly to the police station if [the defendant]
were to enter the building,” were irrelevant. Id. ¶¶1,64-65,77-79. The defendant
argued that the evidence of the precautionary measures could have caused the

39

jury to infer that the defendant was dangerous and violent. Id. ¶81. However, this
Court determined that “any facts the jury could reasonably have inferred from the
[erroneously admitted evidence] were presented to the jury in [] other
testimony.” Id. Moreover, the State did not refer to the irrelevant evidence in
closing. Id. ¶83. Admission was therefore harmless. Id. ¶¶80-84.
Here, unlike in Davis, the State presented no other testimony from which
the jury could have inferred in Bowden an interest in personally using a firearm.
See id. ¶81. Moreover, unlike in Davis, the State emphasized to the jury in closing
that Bowden had the unfired large bullet in his pocket. See id. ¶83;R1304. From
this fact plus Bowden’s access to the firearms and ammunition in the stolen
truck, the State argued a personal interest in firearms and ammunition. R130405. “Obviously this man has an interest in firearms and ammunition. He’s
familiar with guns. This here is the shooter.” R1305. From familiarity, the State
then pointed to evidence that the shooter was “a pretty darn good shot too.”
R1305.
Where Bowden’s connection to the truck only provided access to 9 mm
ammunition, evidence of the large bullet in Bowden’s pocket allowed the State to
personalize an “interest in firearms and ammunition.” From that personal
interest, jurors could speculate that Bowden possessed the necessary familiarity
and competence with weapons to have fired at Tsouras. R1305. The State
presented no evidence otherwise tending to show that Bowden’s intent regarding
the firearms and ammunition in the truck was to shoot them (as opposed, for
40

example, to selling them). Moreover, the firearms and ammunition were available
to anyone else entering or exiting the vehicle. R882-84. The evidence of the
unfired bullet allowed the jury to speculate that Bowden had personal interest
and familiarity from what was otherwise mere access. R1304-05. Moreover, even
with the evidence of the large bullet in Bowden’s pocket, the evidence was
insufficient. See supra Issue I, insufficiency. Evidence of the large bullet on
Bowden’s person may have diverted the jury’s attention from the lack of evidence
otherwise connecting Bowden to the shooting. Unlike in Davis, erroneous
admission of the evidence unreasonably affected “the likelihood of a” guilty
verdict. See id. ¶84.
D.

This issue was preserved, but if this Court finds otherwise, it may
review the issue for plain error.

This issue is preserved. “An issue [] is preserved in the trial court when the
record shows that (1) the issue is” timely raised; “(2) the issue is specifically
raised; and (3) the issue is supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.”
State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191,¶9, 186 P.3d 1023, cert. denied, 199
P.3d 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, defense counsel timely
moved in trial to exclude this evidence. R955-64. He specifically explained how
the evidence was irrelevant and “more prejudicial than probative.” R955,95758,961. He expressed concern that the jury could judge Bowden’s character
because of the bullet in Bowden’s pocket. R955. By arguing the evidence’s
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irrelevance and potential prejudice, defense counsel timely and specifically raised
the issue, supported by relevant legal authority.
To the extent the Court believes this issue is not preserved, it should review
the issue for plain error. This Court may reverse an unpreserved error when “(1)
an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3)
the error is harmful.” Powell, 2007 UT 9,¶18 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)).
First, the trial court committed error. Evidence of the unfired bullet in
Bowden’s pocket was irrelevant, inadmissible, and more prejudicial than
probative. See supra Issue II, irrelevance. Bowden’s possessing the large bullet
did not connect him to the weapon that shot at Tsouras or provide evidence of
knowledge or intent. See Reece, 2015 UT 45,¶¶66-67; Fedorowicz, 2002 UT
67,¶¶33-34. Instead, it provided the opportunity for the jury to “draw
unwarranted inferences” regarding his character. See Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296;
Farmer, 698 A.2d at 949.
Second, this error was obvious. An error is obvious when the law is wellsettled at the time of trial. See Powell, 2007 UT 9,¶20. It is well-settled that
evidence must have “a tendency” to make a fact that is “of consequence in
determining the action” to be relevant. Utah R. Evid. 401. It is well-settled that
irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. It is well-settled that to be
admissible, evidence connecting a defendant to a weapon must make more likely
a defendant’s personal involvement in the charged crime. See Reece, 2015 UT
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45,¶¶66-67; Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,¶¶33-34. It is also well-settled that
proclivities are not relevant. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,¶32. Moreover, it is wellsettled that evidence inviting unwarranted inferences may be excluded under
Rule 403. See Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296. The trial court here even considered the
evidence irrelevant, initially. R959. But then, in light of the “low bar for
relevance,” and the State’s claim that someone carrying an unfired bullet is more
likely to shoot at an officer, the trial court admitted the evidence on grounds of its
lack of prejudicial effect. R959-64. But the trial court never explained the
evidence’s relevance. See R959-64. This makes more obvious the relevance error.
Lastly, this error prejudiced Bowden because there was a likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for Bowden had the trial court excluded the irrelevant
and prejudicial evidence. See supra, Issue II, irrelevance. Unlike in Davis, the
State otherwise lacked sufficient evidence identifying Bowden as the shooter. See
Davis, 2013 UT App 228,¶81; see supra, Issue I, insufficiency. In fact, the State
said it offered the evidence as leading to an inference of Bowden’s personal
interest, connection, comfort, and familiarity with firearms for the purpose
identifying Bowden as the shooter. R956-57,961-62. The evidence of the unfired
bullet in Bowden’s pocket led the jury to speculate that Bowden had an interest in
shooting firearms and therefore was more likely to have shot at Tsouras.
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III.

The trial court erred by failing to merge Bowden’s convictions
for discharge of a firearm with his conviction for attempted
aggravated murder.
The convictions for attempted aggravated murder and discharge of a

firearm should merge because the convictions involved a single act and each
discharge was necessarily proven by the evidence used to prove attempted
aggravated murder. “Merger is a judicially-crafted doctrine available to protect
criminal defendants from being twice punished for committing a single act that
may violate more than one criminal statute.” State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶7, 122
P.3d 615 (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,
¶17, 55 P.3d 1131; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977). Utah’s merger
doctrine, codified in part at Utah Code section 76-1-402, is interpreted “to
comply with the underlying constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.”
State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Lopez, 2004 UT
App 410,¶8, 103 P.3d 153.
“[W]hen the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall
establish offenses which may be punished in different ways under different
provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under only one such
provision.” UTAH CODE §76-1-402(1). “A defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the
offense charged and the included offense.” UTAH CODE §76-1-402(3). An offense
is a lesser included offense when “[i]t is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.”
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Utah Code §76-1-402(3)(a); see also State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶9, 71
P.3d 624.
Utah courts “apply a two part test to determine whether an offense is a
lesser included offense.” Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶10; see Ross, 951 P.2d at 241;
State v. Hill, 674, P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983)). The first step is to “compare the
statutory elements of the offenses.” Id. If the two crimes are “such that the
greater cannot be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser,
then the lesser offense merges into the greater crime and the State cannot convict
and punish the defendant for both offenses.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Only if the first analytical step does not resolve the issue need [this Court]
proceed to the second analytical step.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted). “In most cases, comparison of the statutory elements will suffice to
determine whether a greater-lesser relationship exists.” Id. Where the crimes
have multiple variations, however, the court will proceed to the second step and
“‘consider the evidence to determine whether the greater-lesser relationship
exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at trial….’”
Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Utah courts focus on the State’s theory when applying the second part of
the test. See Hill, 674 P.2d at 98 (considering the variation of aggravated robbery
presented to the jury when deciding whether theft was a lesser included offense);
Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶22-27 (focusing on state’s theory). A conviction for a
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lesser offense cannot be upheld “merely because the jury could have found an
additional element.” Ross, 951 P.2d at 243. Instead, a conviction for a lesser must
be reversed “unless the jury was ‘required to find’ the additional element.” Id.
(quoting State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 878 (Utah 1988)).
Applying the first part of this test shows that discharge of a firearm was a
lesser included offense of attempted aggravated murder and that the discharge
counts should have been merged. Comparing the statutory elements of the
offenses demonstrates that “the greater cannot be committed without necessarily
having committed the lesser.” See Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶10. The discharge
statute defines the crime of discharge of a firearm in one of three ways: (a) “. . . in
the direction of any person or persons, knowing or having reason to believe that
any person may be endangered by the discharge of the firearm;” (b) “in the
direction of any person or habitable structure” “with intent to intimidate or
harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure;” or (c) “in the
direction of any vehicle” “with intent to intimidate or harass another.” UTAH
CODE §76-10-508.1(1). This is also how an attempted aggravated murder could be
committed: attempted aggravated murder requires proof that a defendant
intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause the death of a peace officer. UTAH
CODE §§76-5-202(f),(k),(iv),(m); 76-4-101.
Any attempted aggravated murder committed by firing a gun includes all of
the elements for discharge in the direction of a person with knowledge or having
a reason to believe the person is endangered. Compare UTAH CODE §§76-5-202
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with 76-10-508(1). If the State presented evidence by which a jury could find that
the defendant fired a gun in the direction of another person, with the intent to or
with knowledge the action could cause death, then each individual discharge
would be established by “proof of the same or less than all the facts” required to
prove attempted murder. Ross, 951 P.2d at 242. The actus reus of the variation of
discharge under subsection (a), namely, to “discharge a firearm in the direction of
any person,” is an act proven by evidence of the act of attempting to murder by
firing bullets which fly from the firearm and strike objects, such as a vehicle in
which a person is sitting. UTAH CODE §76-10-508.1(1)(a). Further, the
requirement that the defendant acted, “knowing or having reason to believe that
any person may be endangered by the discharge of the firearm,” is encompassed
by proof of the intentional or knowing mental state required by attempted
murder.
Under the elements of attempted murder and discharge of a firearm, there
is a variation, subsection (a), where “the greater cannot be committed without
necessarily having committed the lesser,” such that the lesser crime merges into
the greater. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. While discharge of a firearm is not necessarily
always a lesser included offense of attempted murder, it may, in at least one
variation, be “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the [attempted murder].” Id. (quotation omitted).
Because there are multiple variations of discharge, the second part of the
test requires consideration of the evidence and the State’s theory “to determine
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whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of
the crimes actually proved at trial.” Id. The evidence, arguments, and jury
instructions, demonstrates that once the State proved attempted aggravated
murder, the jury did not need to find an additional element to convict Bowden of
discharge. See Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶10; Bradley, 752 P.2d at 878. Witness
testimony and exhibits show that bullets were fired at Tsouras. R801-02,80405,816-818,827,858-60,870,878-79,942,1046-60,1068-1073,1080-81,108599,1165-71,1209-12. This same evidence, indicating that a gun was pointed and
fired at Tsouras was used to prove both the discharges and the attempted
aggravated murder. R801-02,804-05,816-818,827,858-60,870,878-79,942,104660,1068-1073,1080-81,1085-99,1165-71,1209-12.
Under the State’s theory, Bowden could not have committed the attempted
aggravated murder without committing the firearm discharge. See Hill, 674 P.2d
at 87. The State argued that the firearm discharge occurred when someone shot,
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly towards Tsouras and Tsouras’s vehicle.
R1292-93. The State argued that the attempted aggravated murder occurred
when someone intentionally shot at Tsouras, knowing that he was a peace officer,
attempting, with the fired bullets, to cause his death. R1294-97. The State then
clarified, conflating the crimes in rebuttal, arguing that if the firing of four bullets
towards the driver of the police vehicle “is not attempted aggravated murder . . . I
have no idea what it is.” R1325-26. Discharge of a firearm was the only means by
which the shooter committed attempted aggravated murder. See Chukes, 2003
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UT App 155,¶22-27;R801-802,816-818,827-28,859-860,870,878-79,105758,1073,1080-93,1098-99,1165-70. Although the jury instructions for discharge
included the three alternatives in section 76-10-508.1(1)(a)-(c), the State
presented no evidence or argument of intent to harass or intimidate with the
shooting, as opposed to trying to kill Tsouras. R1294-97. Hence, the variation of
section 76-10-508.1 actually proved could only be subsection (a).
Cases where convictions did not merge involved circumstances where the
elements of one crime were not necessarily included in the elements of another.
For example, discharge was not a lesser included offense of witness tampering
because “there was evidence other than the discharge of the firearm upon which
the jury could base Defendant's conviction for witness tampering.” State v.
Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,¶22, 42 P.3d 1248. In State v. Suarez, 736 P.2d 1040,
1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the defendant’s “taking of indecent liberties” by first
placing his mouth on the victim’s breasts and then placing his hand on her vagina
were “separate acts requiring proof of different elements and constitute separate
offenses.” In contrast here, all of the elements for discharge in the direction of a
person, knowing that a person would be endangered, are included in the
elements for attempted aggravated murder; merger is therefore required.
Case law from other jurisdictions further supports Bowden’s claim. For
example, a defendant could not be convicted in New Mexico for both homicide
and causing great bodily harm where both convictions were premised on the
unitary act of firing seven gunshots at a vehicle driven by the victim. State v.
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Montoya, 306 P.3d 426 (N.M. 2013); see also People v. Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d
827, 836-37 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005), as modified on denial of reh'g (holding
reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to cause
serious bodily injury because all of the elements are established by “the
establishment of every element of first degree assault with intent to cause serious
bodily injury”); Alston v. State, 643 A.2d 468 (Md.Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (holding
that reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of murder, where the
defendant engaged in a shootout, killing bystander); Montes v. State, 421 S.E.2d
710 (Ga. 1992) (holding assault convictions merged with murder conviction
where the evidence of aggravated assault—that the defendant fired a deadly
weapon and wounded the deceased victim—was also used to prove that defendant
had committed murder).
In determining merger, some courts consider whether the convictions
involve a single criminal episode, and assess whether the evidence used to prove
the commission of one crime was used to prove the commission of another. As
used in Utah Code section 76-1-402, “single criminal episode” means “all conduct
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.” State v. Irvin, 2007 UT App
319,¶18, 169 P.3d 798 (citing UTAH CODE § 76-1-401). The test for “whether there
are separate offenses or one offense is whether the evidence discloses one general
intent or discloses separate and distinct intents.” Id. (quoting State v. Crosby,
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927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996)). “If there is but one intent, one general impulse,
and one plan, . . . there is but one offense.” Id.
In Irvin, the defendant robbed a store clerk, took the clerk’s keys, and fled
in her car. Id. at ¶19. The Irvin court determined that taking the keys “was part of
one intention, one general impulse, and one plan,” and therefore the defendant
committed only one aggravated robbery. Id. The defendant had taken cash from
the register and the clerk’s keys “within a matter of seconds.” Id. “The entire
encounter lasted only a few minutes, and the taking of [the] keys was likely done
to facilitate Defendant’s escape with the stolen cash.” Id. Similarly, in State v.
Bell, 2016 UT App 157, ¶¶4,13-14,20, 380 P.3d 11, the defendant’s attempt to steal
a car and his grabbing a purse out of the car and running constituted one act of
aggravated robbery and not two.
Other jurisdictions also consider whether the evidence used to prove
commission of one crime was used to prove the commission of another crime. See
e.g., State v. Watkins, 236 P.3d 770 (Or.Ct.App. 2010) (multiple counts of assault
arising from single criminal episode merged); Brown v. State, 539 S.E.2d 545
(Ga.Ct.App. 2000) (aggravated assault and aggravated battery merged where
defendant’s “actions were the result of a ‘single act of firing a series of shots in
quick succession at the victim’” (citation omitted)); Grace v. State, 425 S.E.2.d
865 (Ga. 1993)(aggravated battery and aggravated assault did not merge where
defendant shot victim twice, but “[t]he evidence used to prove the commission of
the aggravated assault was not used at all in proving the commission of the
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aggravated battery.”); Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C. 1985) (“[t]he
fact a criminal episode of assault involves several blows or wounds, and different
methods of administration, does not convert it into a case of multiple crimes”).
As in Irvin and Bell, the conduct here lasted seconds and supports only one
general intention or plan by the perpetrator. R801-05,858-60,942-46,120917;State’s Exh.147. The State’s theory was that shots were fired with the intent to
kill Tsouras. R1294-97,1325-26.
Although the trial court favorably considered the State’s argument, based
on State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶14, 356 P.3d 125 (R1369-1376), Rasabout has
limited application here. The Rasabout defendant asked the Court to merge each
discharge into one count of discharge of a firearm. Id. ¶7. In Rasabout, “each shot
[carried] an independent harm.” Id. ¶14. Thus, the term “discharge” referred to
each discrete shot. Id. ¶¶13-14. The Rasabout defendant was not charged with
any higher felony for the multiple discharges to merge into. Id. ¶1. Here, however,
the jury convicted Bowden of attempted aggravated murder in addition to the
separate counts of discharge of a firearm. R1344-46. The discharge convictions
merge with the attempted aggravated murder conviction because, unlike in
Rasabout, all of the elements for discharge under subsection (a) are met when
the elements for attempted aggravated murder are found. See Lopez, 2004 UT
App 410,¶8. Discharge of a firearm in the direction of a person with the requisite
knowledge is so closely related to attempted aggravated murder that discharge
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convictions should merge with attempted aggravated murder. Brown, 432 U.S. at
169.
This issue was preserved. “A claim is preserved when it has been presented
to the district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on it.”
Prater, 2017 UT 13,¶27 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ChavezEspinoza, 2008 UT App 191,¶9. A defendant preserves a merger argument by
raising the issue at any time during trial “or following conviction on a motion to
vacate.” Lopez, 2004 UT App 410,¶7. Defense counsel filed and argued a motion
to vacate following conviction. R435-447,1365-76. The motion specified the
reasons for merger with references to relevant law. R435-447,1367-76.
To the extent the Court believes this issue is not preserved, it should review
the issue for plain error. This Court may reverse an unpreserved error when “(1)
an error exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3)
the error is harmful.” Powell, 2007 UT 9,¶18, 154 P.3d 788.
First, as argued above, the trial court erred in failing to merge the firearm
discharge convictions with the attempted aggravated murder conviction. A
defendant may not be convicted of both an offense and lesser included offenses.
UTAH CODE §76-1-402. Where the facts used to prove the lesser offense are the
same or lesser than facts used to prove an offense, convictions for the lesser
included should be vacated. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶¶10-21. All of the
statutory elements for discharge are met when the elements for attempted
aggravated murder by firing a gun are found. See Lopez, 2004 UT App 410,¶8.
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Here, where proof of the attempted aggravated murder necessarily proved
discharge of a firearm without additional elements, the lesser convictions should
have merged.
Second, the error was obvious because the law regarding merger is wellsettled. It is well-settled that a defendant may not be convicted of both an offense
and lesser included offenses. UTAH CODE §76-1-402. It is well-settled that lesser
included counts should merge when they depend on the same or fewer facts than
those of a greater offense. See Chukes, 2003 UT App 155,¶¶10-21. And it was wellsettled that Rasabout involved multiple instances of discharge of a firearm with
no higher felony for the charges to merge into. See Rasabout, 2015 UT 72,¶¶7-15.
The trial court’s own doubts about how a different court might rule indicates the
trial court’s awareness of well-settled law. R1376.
Lastly, the error is harmful. See Powell, 2007 UT 9,¶18. Erroneous failure
to merge convictions prejudices a defendant because it likely increases a
defendant’s time in prison, even if sentences run concurrent. State v. Finlayson,
2000 UT 10,¶¶25-26, 994 P.2d 1243. Here, but for the trial court’s error, Bowden
would not have been sentenced on the four counts of discharge of a firearm.
CONCLUSION
First, Bowden respectfully asks this Court to reverse and remand with an
order to dismissal the attempted aggravated murder and obstruction of justice
convictions because the evidence was insufficient. Second, Bowden asks this
Court to reverse and remand for a new trial on all counts because of the
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admission of evidence of the unfired bullet in Bowden's pocket was irrelevant and
less probative than prejudicial. Finally, Bowden respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's erroneous ruling on merger and remand for
resentencing.
SUBMITTED this

o< 0 -th day of January 2018.
ANDREA G
D (7205)
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: March 24, 2017
At the direction of:
10:50:15 AM
/s/ L Douglas Hogan
District Court Judge
by
/s/ ANTHONY HENDRICKSON
District Court Clerk
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEREMY MICHAEL BOWDEN,
Defendant.
Custody: Utah County Jail

:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 161400285 FS
Judge:
L DOUGLAS HOGAN
Date:
March 23, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
PRESENT
Clerk:
anthonyh
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WESLEY J HOWARD
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 12, 1982
Sheriff Office#: 267671
Audio
Tape Number:
31
Tape Count: 4:08-4:58

CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
2. RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
3. OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
4. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/23/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi
5. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
6. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
7. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
8. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
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Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 02/03/2017 Guilty
9. FAIL TO STOP AT COMMAND OF LAW ENFORCEME - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/23/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi

HEARING

TIME: 4:09 PM
Counsel for the defendant argues the motion filed on behaf of his client.
TIME: 4:13 PM
State's response.
TIME: 4:17 PM
Defense's rebuttal.
TIME: 4:24 PM
Court rules that count 4 should be vacated.
TIME: 4:32 PM
Victim's wife addresses the court.
TIME: 4:56 PM
Court orders Count 9 closed with credit for time served.

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED MURDER a 1st Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years and
which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE a 2nd Degree
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Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts 1-3 are to run consecutive to each other. Counts 4-7 carry a mandatory term of
3-5 years which are to run concurrent to each other and concurrent to the other counts.
Restitution is to remain open and sent to the Board of Pardons once determined.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
JEREMY BOWDEN
JACOB DRAGE
MICHAEL BOWDEN

Case No: 161400285 Date:

Mar 23, 2017
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CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Utah County jail.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

Case No: 161400285 Date:
Mar 23, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________________
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 161400285 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

UTAH STATE PRISON udc-records@utah.gov
ADC TRANSPORT adc-transportation@slco.org

03/24/2017
Date: ____________________

/s/ ANTHONY HENDRICKSON
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
____________________________________
)
STATE OF UTAH,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
)
JEREMY MICHAEL BOWDEN,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)

Case No. 161400285

TRANSCRIPT OF:
JURY TRIAL
VOLUME 2

BEFORE THE HONORABLE L. DOUGLAS HOGAN

WEST JORDAN COURTHOUSE
8080 SOUTH REDWOOD ROAD
WEST JORDAN, Utah 84088

February 1, 2017

Noteworthy Reporting

801.634.5549
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1

THE COURT:

2

and the defendant are present.

3
4
5
6

All counsel

Is there an item we need to take care of before the
jury comes back?
MR. HOWARD:

Yes, Your Honor.

State has an

exhibit -- is it 148? -- that they intend to introduce.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. PLAYER:

9

THE COURT:

10

We're back on the record.

Okay.
It is -I'm looking at a log video that would

show as a video still from a dash cam.

11

MR. HOWARD:

No, that would be wrong.

12

MR. PLAYER:

No.

158.

13

THE COURT:

158.

Okay.

14

MR. HOWARD:

Yeah.

Unfired round found on

15

Mr. Bowden.

16

officer who is about to testify found on Mr. Bowden is a

17

different caliber than the weapon that was found near the scene

18

of the shooting.

19

defense's position that it's more prejudicial than probative to

20

introduce to the jury the fact that this unfired round is found

21

on Mr. Bowden because I can't read their minds, I don't know

22

what their attitudes are about weapons or firearms.

23

make judgments about his character just by the fact that he has

24

an unfired round in his pocket.

25

doesn't in any way connect him to the shooting that took place

Your Honor, this -- this unfired round that the

It's, I believe, a .44 versus a 9mm.

It's

They may

It's not probative because it

GARY MIDGELY - Redirect by MR. EVERSHED
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1

in front of Les Schwab.

And so we'd ask that the -- the court

2

to exclude that from evidence.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PLAYER:

5

The defense in this matter is that it was a different

Okay.

Response, Mr. Player?

Thanks, Your Honor.

6

individual who fired at Officer Tsouras and so I would look to

7

404(b) for the permitted uses in a criminal case of other acts.

8

If this even is another act, which would be to establish

9

absence of mistake on the part of identity or identity itself.

10

However, I think it's a stretch to call it another act because

11

Mr. Bowden is -- is during the course of the arrest, actually

12

found to be in possession of this .40 caliber unspent

13

cartridge.

14

The fact -- that fact coupled with the fact that

15

there were multiple firearms found in this truck that did not

16

belong to the truck owner, multiple, and a variety of cartridge

17

casings and ammunition found in this stolen truck that did not

18

belong to the truck owner I think does establish that

19

Mr. Bowden, who was in possession of that truck, had access to

20

that truck, was in that truck, had items in that truck, was

21

somebody that was interested in firearms and ammunition,

22

comfortable with firearms and ammunition to the point where

23

he's actually carrying a round -- an unspent cartridge, and our

24

allegation is, another firearm and the rounds for that firearm.

25

And I think that somebody who has that sort of
GARY MIDGELY - Redirect by MR. EVERSHED

197
0956

1

affinity for firearms and ammunition is more likely somebody

2

that is willing to use a firearm or ammunition, you know.

3

Somebody that smokes a cigarette is probably more likely to

4

smoke a cigar than somebody that doesn't smoke at all.

5

I think there is relevance and the standard is not whether it's

6

more -- whether it's prejudicial.

7

probative value has to be substantially outweighed by the

8

danger of unfair prejudice and in this matter we don't think

9

that standard would be met to preclude the State from putting

10

on evidence of a defendant who has been charged with using a

11

firearm.

12

another firearm, on his person at the time of his arrest within

13

minutes of the alleged shooting.

And so

It has to be -- the

The fact that he has ammunition, even if it fits

14

THE COURT:

Do you intend to introduce another

15

firearm as a piece of evidence?

16

MR. PLAYER:

We intend to ask the truck owner if when

17

he went to collect his items other firearms were found in the

18

truck, but, no, we're not going to be presenting to the jury

19

actual, physical other firearms.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. HOWARD:

Okay.
And we're -- we're not going to object

22

to any photographs that the State has showing the contents of

23

this pickup truck and we've already conceded that Mr. Bowden is

24

associated with that vehicle in some way.

25

of the standard that Mr. Player's reminding the Court of, it is

But just going off
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1

creating unfair prejudice to bring up this unspent cartridge in

2

his pocket when it has absolutely no connection to the firearm

3

that was found nearby the shooting and no connection to the

4

cartridges found on the ground at the site of the shooting, no

5

connection to any spent bullets that were found inside Officer

6

Tsouras's car.

7
8
9

It's -- it's not relevant, and it's prejudicial.
Therefore, we would ask the Court to exclude it.
THE COURT:

Okay.

All right.

And correct me if I'm

10

wrong, Counsel, there is no question as to identity.

11

out talking about the rule -- talks about one of the exceptions

12

being identity or to establish identity, that doesn't seem to

13

be the argument you're making now, Mr. Player.

14
15
16

MR. PLAYER:

You start

Is that right?

The argument about the identity has been

made by counsel for -THE COURT:

Right.

Right.

But I took it from -- and

17

maybe I may be wrong because we're not there yet, Mr. Howard.

18

I took it from the way that some of your questions have been

19

going and in our opening statement that you're not contesting

20

that Mr. Bowden is associated with that truck?

21

MR. HOWARD:

22

We're conceding that.

We are not contesting that, Your Honor.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

You're conceding that.

Are you --

24

and maybe I'm jumping the gun.

25

the interaction that's initially held with officer -- is it

Are you conceding the fact that
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1

Croft?

2

MR. PLAYER:

3

THE COURT:

Clark.
Clark.

Officer Clark when he challenges

4

at the truck, are you conceding that that is in fact

5

Mr. Bowden?

6

MR. HOWARD:

Yes, Your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. HOWARD:

Yes.

9

THE COURT:

Okay.

At that point in time?

All right.

I agree with the

10

defense.

11

particularly relevant and without getting to the 404(b)

12

analysis on relevancy grounds, I'm going to exclude it.

13

don't think it's relevant.

14

I don't think this -- this piece of evidence is

MR. PLAYER:

I

Is the Court precluding me from talking

15

about the items in the truck?

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. PLAYER:

18

THE COURT:

No.

No.

Sounds like the Court is not.
No.

I just don't -- I just don't think

19

it's relevant to bring up that he had one of the cartridges in

20

his -- on his person, in his pocket.

21

how that helps any of the charged offenses, how it's relevant

22

to the offenses as charged in the information.

23

I don't see how that --

Do you want to make further argument on that because

24

I -- you responded to 404(b) and Mr. Howard also mentioned

25

relevance.

I'm having a hard time seeing the relevance.
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1
2

MR. PLAYER:
who is --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PLAYER:

5

The relevance was my example of somebody

Right.
-- carrying ammunition is somebody

that's more comfortable with using it within minutes of a --

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PLAYER:

-- of a shooting.

8

MR. HOWARD:

That's -- that's a NRA argument there,

9

Right.

Your Honor.

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. HOWARD:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. HOWARD:

14

THE COURT:

Right.

Right.

Any number of people -Right.
-- feel comfortable.
Mr. Howard is not objecting to -- are

15

there photographs of the vehicle, the contents of the vehicle,

16

you're going to have the owner talk about what was discovered

17

in the vehicle that was not his, you're not objecting to any of

18

that, right, Mr. Howard?

19

MR. EVERSHED:

I think the test for relevance is

20

frankly evidence is relevant if for -- 401, if it has any

21

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would --

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. EVERSHED:

Right.
-- be without the evidence.

In this

24

case, the allegation is that the defendant used a firearm,

25

fired that firearm at a police car and then fled.

The fact
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1

that he has an unspent cartridge in his pocket just goes to

2

show that he is familiar with firearms, that he is somehow

3

connected to them.

4

imagine, who in this room has an unspent cartridge case in

5

their pocket?

6

more likely than not, it is more -- more or less than probable.

7

It does have a tendency to show that he is

Not everybody in the world, I would

Just that fact alone it just shows that it is

8

comfortable with this and when it's -- when the charge is he

9

uses a firearm, he fires a firearm at a defenseless police

10

officer, the fact that he has a cartridge casing, even though

11

it's a different caliber does meet the relevancy requirement

12

that it does have a tendency to make that more or less probable

13

than it would without the evidence.

14

position on relevance.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. HOWARD:

I think that's the State's

Okay.
Your Honor, that argument is extremely

17

attenuating because you could make that argument if he had a

18

pocketknife.

19

knife is a person more likely to shoot at an officer.

20

an argument you can make, but it's -- it's far from conclusive.

21

It's not relevant in this case.

22

argument at this point if that had been a 9mm unspent cartridge

23

in his pocket, but it wasn't.

24

caliber and has no relevance in regard to the shooting that

25

took place at Les Schwab.

Any person who carries a pocketknife or a hunting
That's

We wouldn't be having this

It's a completely different
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1

MR. EVERSHED:

Well, I think coupled with a very

2

standard low standard of relevancy, it's a very low standard.

3

It's any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than

4

[inaudible].

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

I will agree with the State on the

6

relevance argument.

That takes us back to 404.

7

puts the argument back in 404(b).

8

MR. EVERSHED:

9

MR. PLAYER:

So then that

Correct?

I think --

Or 403.

10

MR. EVERSHED:

11

talking about 403, specifically.

I think -- I think the defense was

12

THE COURT:

13

And again, Mr. Player, your analogy and your argument

14

is simply that it's more likely that someone who is comfortable

15

with firearms and the type of person that would actually use

16

one, it's more -- is more likely that Mr -- Mr. Bowden, because

17

he's got an unspent cartridge is, in fact, that person?

18
19

MR. PLAYER:

I'm sorry.

Sorry.

When they make the -- the issue that

there is some third unknown individual, was after doing this.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. PLAYER:

Right.
And you've got an individual who has --

22

is interested in firearms and ammunition, has ammunition on his

23

person, has been in a truck, has a variety of ammunition and

24

firearms?

25

THE COURT:

Talk to me more about that.

What else is
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1
2
3
4
5
6

found on the truck?

What?

MR. PLAYER:

There are at least four different

caliber of ammunitions in that truck that -THE COURT:

None of which -- none of which the owner

of the truck claims is his?
MR. PLAYER:

Correct.

357.

There is a -- there is a

7

.380 that I can think of off the top of my head.

8

a .40 caliber inside of the truck.

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. PLAYER:

There is also

Okay.
That -- that the owner of the truck

11

says, "Those aren't mine."

12

says those -- "There were guns in that truck when I came to

13

identify my property that weren't mine."

14

There is guns in that truck that he

That means somebody that is -- has that volume and

15

that variety of firearms and ammunition is somebody that is

16

comfortable with them and has them.

17

you're -- have the opportunity, possibly, to use one.

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

And if you have one,

All right.

And, again,

19

Mr. Howard, your argument is that that's going to be unfairly

20

prejudicial?

21

MR. HOWARD:

22

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
The jury being -- yet we're going to have

23

pictures that show all these other things that you're not

24

objecting to.

25

MR. HOWARD:

I'm not objecting to the pictures of the
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1

vehicle and what was inside.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. PLAYER:

4

outweighed by unfair prejudice.

5

THE COURT:

6

deny your objection.

7

cartridge, although it differs in caliber from the weapon that

8

was used is going to be unfairly prejudicial given the totality

9

of the evidence that's going to be presented here.

And the standard is substantially

Right.

Mr. Howard, I'm going to

I do not think that finding the unspent

10

with the State's argument.

11

Okay.

12

Right.

I agree

I'm going to allow it.

Thank you.

Is there anything else we need to

take care of before the jury returns?

13

MR. PLAYER:

14

MR. EVERSHED:

No.

We're calling Shane Franchow.

No.

In terms of housekeeping I think

15

we have three witnesses left.

16

fair that we will get through all of them.

17

We might be done in an hour or so, but that's -- that's where

18

we'll cap.

19

is going to be lengthy.

20

this is once we're done with these three, we will be done.

21
22

I think we'll -- I think it's
I don't know when.

Our next witness that we will begin with tomorrow

THE COURT:

I guess the only reason why I'm saying

It wouldn't make sense to start the next

one?

23

MR. EVERSHED:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. EVERSHED:

Yes.

Okay.
And we're on track and we will be done
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1
2

A.

So I went back to my trunk to retrieve my duty-issued

rifle.

3

Q.

What kind of rifle?

4

A.

It is a AR-15.

5

Q.

Okay. Nothing further.

6
7

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, is there any
questions?

8

Okay. Thank you, Officer.

9

THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.

10

THE COURT: You are excused.

11

MR. EVERSHED: Yes, Your Honor, he's excused. That

12

will be our last witness, Your Honor. All of the exhibits are

13

in and the State would now rest.

14
15

THE COURT: Okay. With that, is now an appropriate
time to take a recess, Mr. Howard? Mr. Evershed?

16

MR. EVERSHED: Yes, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT: Okay. We're going to take about a

18

five-minute recess and then we'll reconvene. Okay.

19

Mr. Stewart, do you want to escort out.

20

THE BAILIFF: Please remain seated.

21

THE COURT: The jury has now exited the courtroom.

22

The State has rested.

23

Mr. Howard.

24

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, let me present at this time

25

a motion for a directed verdict in this matter.

ANDREW O'GWIN - Direct by MR. EVERSHED
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1

Before the Court should properly send this to the

2

jury, there has to be sufficient evidence that a reasonable

3

jury can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence

4

suggests that the defendant -- or that they -- there's

5

sufficient evidence for the jury to find guilt beyond a

6

reasonable doubt.

7

And I think in this case, the defendant was

8

identified by Officer Clark at the Mouse Pad; thereafter, after

9

identification or descriptions of the perpetrator firing the

10
11

weapon is inconsistent at best.
Ms. Wiley, whom we just had on the witness stand,

12

Officer Trooper O'Gwin, and -- excuse me, Officer Tsouras have

13

different descriptions of what this individual looked like.

14

It's our assertion, Your Honor, that there's not

15

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a

16

reasonable doubt that Mr. Bowden is, in fact, the person that

17

fired at the officer that day and submit that to the Court.

18

THE COURT: Okay. Any response?

19

MR. EVERSHED: Your Honor, we have Mr. Bowden located

20

at the Mouse Pad. There's no dispute to that. We have him

21

running westbound according to Officer Clark. We have

22

Ms. Wiley saying that she sees one individual running, pointed

23

nose, identifies white male, bandanna, jacket running --

24

exactly what he's wearing running through that parking lot. We

25

see one male going through the Les Schwab parking lot. He's
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1

seen on a dash cam video with a jacket, blue jeans, white

2

shoes, wearing exactly what he's wearing at the Mouse Pad,

3

firing at this officer and then going northbound, housing his

4

gun. And who is found 22 minutes after this whole thing, after

5

a containment is set up is none other than Mr. Bowden. And

6

we've established identity.

7

THE COURT: Okay. In considering the evidence that's

8

been presented, the Court will acknowledge that some of the

9

descriptions, details of the descriptions changed from witness

10

to witness. However, those inconsistencies, given the period

11

of time each of the persons, each of the respective witnesses

12

had an opportunity to make an observation, the Court does find

13

there is still sufficient evidence for a jury, a reasonable

14

jury to make a finding on this case. And, therefore, I'm going

15

to deny Mr. Howard's motion for directed verdict.

16

I do believe a reasonable jury, given the evidence,

17

could convict the defendant, and that the State has, in fact,

18

put on a prima facie case against the defendant for each of the

19

counts as charged.

20

All right. With that, Mr. Howard.

21

MR. HOWARD: Could we just approach for a moment,

22

Your Honor.

23

THE COURT: Yes.

24

(Discussion held at sidebar off the record.)

25

THE COURT: You think it will work?
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FELONY DISCHARGE OF A
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-v-

JEREMY MICHAEL BOWDEN,

Case no. 161400285
JUDGE L. DOUGLAS HOGAN

Defendant

Jeremy M. Bowden (Bowden), by and through counsel, Wesley J. Howard, moves this
Court to vacate his convictions on five counts of felony discharge of a firearm, on the grounds
that the convictions on those counts are based on the events which occurred in the course of a
single criminal episode. Bowden’s motion is supported by the following memorandum.

FACTS
In support of its theory of the case, the State offered the testimony of Detective Nate
Clark (Clark) who told the jury of an encounter with Bowden during the evening of October 30,
2015. Clark testified he attempted to stopped Bowden as Bowden approached and attempted to
enter a stolen motor vehicle. Instead of complying, Bowden fled on foot. Clark radioed to police
dispatch, and other officers, that a suspect was running west near 7200 South.
Officer Cory Tsouras (Tsouras) also testified for the State, explaining how he was on
patrol in his police vehicle the night of October 30, 2015 when he heard Clark’s radio
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communication. Almost immediately thereafter, Tsouras spotted a person running in the area in
the direction described. According to Tsouras, the suspect eventually left the sidewalk parallel to
7200 South and crossed through the Les Schwab parking lot. It was there, Tsouras testified, that
he attempted to stop the suspect. According to Tsouras, as he drew near the suspect, the suspect
fired on him. Tsouras immediately accelerated forward and away from the suspect. When
Tsouras found his path forward blocked, he exited his vehicle and sought refuge behind the engine
block. Meanwhile Tsouras continued to received rounds fired from the suspect. Testimony from
Tsouras and physical evidence at the scene suggest at least five rounds were fired during the
engagement.
Additional witnesses for the State testified that Bowden was found and captured in the
area shortly thereafter. The Defense conceded that Bowden was the person Clark encountered
and that Bowden was the person arrested nearby a short time later. State argued that Bowden
was the same person encountered by Tsouras. The State also argued that the five rounds fired by
Bowden were not warning shots or an attempt to intimidate Tsouras, but rather constituted
Bowden’s attempt to murder Officer Tsouras.
After careful deliberation by the jury, Bowden was found guilty of all nine charges,
including five counts of Felony Discharge of a Firearm.

ARGUMENT
I. THE DEFENDANT’S FIVE CONVICTIONS FOR FELONY DISCHARGE OF A
FIREARM SHOULD MERGE WITH THE CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
MURDER.

This Court should vacate the Defendant’s convictions on five counts of felony discharge
of a firearm because the convictions merge with the conviction for attempted murder. This is
because all convictions stem from a single criminal episode and all felony discharge counts were
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necessarily proven by the evidence used to prove attempted murder. “Merger is a judiciallycrafted doctrine available to protect criminal defendants from being twice punished for
committing a single act that may violate more than one criminal statute.”State v. Diaz, 2002 UT
App 288, ¶17, 55 P.3d 1131. “The protection against double jeopardy is guaranteed in both the
federal and Utah state constitutions.” State v. Trafny, 799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990) (citing
U.S. Const. amend. V; Utah Const. art. I, § 12). To this end, the federal constitution provides
that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life of limb.”
U.S. Const. amend. V. The analogous clause of the Utah constitution reads “[t]he accused shall
not be . . . twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” Utah Const. art. I, § 12.
Utah’s merger doctrine, codified in part at Utah Code § 76-1-402, is interpreted “to
comply with the underlying constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy.”State v. Ross, 951
P.2d 236, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. Lopez, 2004 UT App 410, ¶8, 103 P.3d 153, 155.
“[W]hen the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and any sentence under any
such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-1402(1).
A. Felony discharges of a firearm and attempted murder occurred in a single criminal
episode.
As used in § 76-1-402, “[t]he term “’single criminal episode’means all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.” State v. Irvin, 2007 UT App 319, ¶18, 169 P.3d 798 (citing Utah Code Ann. §76-1401 (2003)). As Utah Court of Appeals noted:
[T]he general test as to whether there are separate offenses or one offense is whether the
evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. The
particular facts and circumstances of each case determine the question. If there is but one
intention, one general impulse, and one plan, even though there is a series of transactions,
there is but one offense.
Irvin, 2007 UT App 319 at ¶18 (citing State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1996) (citation
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omitted)).
To illustrate, in Irvin, the defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery
after a jury trial and the Court of Appeals later concluded “that only one act of aggravated
robbery occurred.” Irvin, 2007 UT App 319 at ¶19. In that case, the defendant robbed a store
clerk at knife point, after which he took the clerk’s car keys and fled in her vehicle. Id. The Irvin
court decided that the taking of the keys “was part of ‘one intention, one general impulse, and one
plan,’and Defendant committed only one aggravated robbery.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
To that end, the defendant took cash from the register and the clerk’s keys “within a matter of
seconds.” Id. The court added that “[t]he entire encounter lasted only a few minutes, and the
taking of [the] keys was likely done to facilitate Defendant’s escape with the stolen cash.” Id.
Similar to Irvin, in determining whether convictions are a part of single criminal episode,
other jurisdictions assess whether the evidence used to prove the commission of one crime was
used to prove the commission of another. See Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086 (D.C.
1985) (“[t]he fact a criminal episode of assault involves several blows or wounds, and different
methods of administration, does not convert it into a case of multiple crimes”); State v. Watkins,
236 P.3d 770 (Or.Ct.App. 2010) (multiple counts of assault arising from single criminal episode
merged); Brown v. State, 539 S.E.2d 545 (Ga.Ct.App. 2000) (aggravated assault and aggravated
battery merged where defendant’s “actions were the result of a ‘single act of firing a series of
shots in quick succession at the victim’”(citation omitted)); Grace v. State, 425 S.E.2.d 865 (Ga.
1993)(aggravated battery and aggravated assault did not merge where defendant shot victim
twice, but “[t]he evidence used to prove the commission of the aggravated assault was not used
at all in proving the commission of the aggravated battery.”).
Like in Irvin, the conduct in this case lasted mere seconds, and supports only one general
intention or plan by the perpetrator. The State’s theory of the case was that the five shots were
fired with intent to kill Tsouras. There is no way to determine the sequence of the shots, or if one
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or another was fired for a different purpose. The underlying objective of the shots, according to
the State’s theory, was to kill rather than merely intimidate Tsouras.
B. Felony discharge of a firearm can be a lesser included offense of attempted murder.
Consistently with the “one general intent”theory, “[a] defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and
the included offense.”Utah Code §76-1-402(3). “An offense is a lesser included offense when
‘[i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the
commission of [another] offense.’”State v. Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶9, 71 P.3d 624.
“Utah courts apply a two-tier analysis to identify lesser-included offenses.”Ross, 951 P.2d
at 241. In applying this test, this Court should first compare the statutory elements of each
offense, and “[i]f the two crimes are such that the greater cannot be committed without
necessarily having committed the lesser, then the lesser offense merges into the greater crime and
the State cannot convict and punish the defendant for both offenses.”Id. “In most cases,
comparison of the statutory elements will suffice to determine whether a greater-lesser
relationship exists.”Id.
Where the crimes have multiple variations, however, the court will proceed to the second
step and “‘consider the evidence[, arguments, and jury instructions] to determine whether the
greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually proved at
trial… .’”Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶10. Utah courts focus on the State’s theory when applying
the second part of the test. See State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah 1983) (considering the
variation of aggravated robbery presented to the jury when deciding whether theft was a lesser
included offense); Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ¶ 22-27 (focusing on state’s theory). A conviction
for a lesser offense cannot be upheld “merely because the jury could have found an additional
element.”Id. Instead, a conviction for a lesser must be reversed “unless the jury was ‘required to
find’the additional element.”Id.
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Application of this two-part test shows that each count of felony discharge of a firearm
was a lesser included offense of attempted murder in this case, and therefore each discharge count
should merge into the attempted murder conviction.
Under the first step of Utah’s test, examination of the statutes demonstrates that discharge
of a firearm can be a lesser included offense of attempted murder. Ross, 951 P.2d at 241. The
discharge statute makes it a crime to discharge a firearm in one of three ways: (a) “. . . in the
direction of any person or persons, knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be
endangered by the discharge of the firearm;”(b) “in the direction of any person or habitable
structure”“with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable
structure;”or (c) in the direction of any vehicle”“with intent to intimidate or harass another.”
Utah Code §76-10-508.1(1). In order to commit the offense of attempted murder, a person must
have attempted to intentionally or knowingly cause the death of another. Utah Code §76-5-203.
The first variation of discharge of a firearm requires firing a gun in the direction of a
person with knowledge or having reason to believe a person is endangered. Utah Code §76-10508.1(1). This is also a manner in which a knowing or intentional attempted homicide could be
committed. In fact, any intentional or knowing attempt to kill by firing a gun at a person would
include all of the elements for discharge in the direction of a person with knowledge or having a
reason to believe the person is endangered.
The State could prove the defendant had the knowledge that an act presented a danger to
a person’s physical safety by showing he acted with the intent to cause death or knowledge that
the nature of his conduct would likely result in death. If the State presented evidence by which a
jury could find that the defendant fired a gun in the direction of another person, with the intent to
or with knowledge that the action could cause death or serious bodily injury, then each individual
discharge would be established by “proof of the same or less than all the facts”required to prove
both attempted murder. Ross, 951 P.2d at 242. The actus reus of the offense of discharge of a
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firearm under subsection (a), namely, to “discharge a firearm in the direction of any person,”is an
act proven by evidence of the bullet flying from the firearm and striking an object, such a vehicle,
in which a person is sitting. Further, the requirement that the defendant acted “knowing or having
reason to believe that any person may be endangered by the discharge of the firearm”is
encompassed by proof of the intentional or knowing mental state required by attempted murder.
Utah Code §76-10-508.1(1).
Under the elements of attempted murder and discharge of a firearm, therefore, there is a
variation, subsection (a), where “the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having
committed the lesser,”such that the lesser crimes merge into the greater. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97.
While discharge of a firearm is not necessarily always a lesser included offense of attempted
murder, it may, in at least one variation, be “established by proof of the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission of the [attempted murder].”Id. (quotation omitted).
The difference between the circumstances here and those where the convictions do not
merge also demonstrates that the Defendant’s convictions should merge in this case. Cases where
convictions did not merge involved different acts or circumstances where the elements of one
crime were not necessarily included in the elements of another. For example, discharge of a
firearm was not a lesser included offense of witness tampering because “there was evidence other
than the discharge of the firearm upon which the jury could base Defendant's conviction for
witness tampering.”State v. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50, ¶ 22, 42 P.3d 1248, 1252; State v. Suarez,
736 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
The circumstances here ultimately differ from these non-merger cases because all of the
elements for discharge of a firearm in the direction of a person, knowing that a person would be
endangered, are included in the elements for attempted murder; therefore, merger is required.
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C. The evidence presented at trial and the State’s theory of the case demonstrates that
the greater-lesser relationship existed between the specific variations of the offenses
actually proved at trial.
Because there are multiple variations of the offense of discharge of a firearm, the second
part of the test requires a consideration of the evidence and the State’s theory “to determine
whether the greater-lesser relationship exists between the specific variations of the crimes actually
proved at trial.”Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. The evidence, arguments, and jury instructions demonstrate
that once the State proved attempted murder, the jury did not need to find an additional element
to convict the Defendant of felony discharge of a firearm. See State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874
(Utah 1988); Chukes, 2003 UT App 155. In this case, five bullets were fired at Tsouras’vehicle.
The gunshots came in rapid succession. This same evidence, indicating that the Defendant
pointed a gun in the direction of Tsouras and fired five times was used to prove each count of
discharge of a firearm, as well as the offense of attempted murder.
Under the State’s theory, therefore, the Defendant could not have committed attempted
murder without committing the offense of discharge of a firearm. That offense was merely the
means by which the Defendant committed attempted aggravated murder. See id. ¶22-27. The
State presented no argument for how the jury could convict the Defendant of discharge of a
firearm, other than that the elements of that offense were present within the elements of attempted
murder. Although the jury instructions for discharge of a firearm included two of the three
alternatives in section 76-10-508.1(1)(a)-(c), the State presented no evidence or argument that the
Defendant only intended to harass or intimidate Cabrera with the shooting. Hence, the only
variation of section 76-10-508.1 actually proved was subsection (a).
Further, the Utah Supreme Court’s recognition that some crimes are so related as to be
appropriate for merger even though they do not meet the section 76-1-402 test further supports
the Defendant’s argument that the discharge counts should merge with the attempted murder
conviction. See Finlayson, 2000 UT 10; State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶31, 128 P.3d 1179. Discharge
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of a firearm in the direction of a person with the requisite knowledge is so closely related to
intentional or knowing attempted homicide that discharge convictions should merge with
attempted murder under this rationale. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977).
Case law from other jurisdictions further supports the Defendant’s claim. For example, a
defendant could not be convicted in New Mexico for both homicide and causing great bodily
harm where both convictions were premised on the unitary act of firing seven gunshots at a
vehicle driven by the victim. State v. Montoya, 306 P.3d 426 (N.M. 2013); see also People v.
Tallwhiteman, 124 P.3d 827, 836-37 (Colo. App. 2005), as modified on denial of reh'g (holding
reckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of assault with intent to cause serious bodily
injury because all of the elements are established by “the establishment of every element of first
degree assault with intent to cause serious bodily injury”); Alston v. State, 643 A.2d 468
(Md.Ct.App. 1994) (holding that reckless endangerment is a lesser-included offense of murder,
where the defendant engaged in a shootout, killing bystander); Montes v. State, 421 S.E.2d 710
(Ga. 1992) (holding the assault convictions merged with the murder conviction where the
evidence used to prove aggravated assault— that the defendant fired a deadly weapon and
wounded the deceased victim— was also used to prove that defendant had committed murder).
In this case, the attempted murder and felony discharge counts were factually
indistinguishable. Put another way, the attempted murder was committed by way of felony
discharge of a firearm. And because this greater-lesser relationship existed between the counts,
the Defendant’s convictions should merge.

II.

IF MERGED, THE CONVICTIONS MUST BE VACATED.

Once a jury returns convictions on multiple charges, the merger issues become ripe for
adjudication. State v. Ellis, 2014 UT App 185, ¶12, 336 P.3d 26 (citing State v. Lopez, 2004 UT
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App 410, ¶¶8-9, 103 P.3d 153)(further citations omitted). Since a criminal defendant may not be
sentenced on more than one of the merged crimes, the trial court has to vacate all merged
convictions. See id. For instance, in Irvin, supra, the court ultimately vacated one of the
defendant’s convictions for aggravated robbery. Irvin, 2007 UT App 319 at ¶36. Similarly, in
State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, 326 P.3d 645, our Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s
conviction for aggravated kidnapping because the charge was used as an aggravator in an
aggravated murder conviction and, accordingly, was a lesser-included charge of the aggravated
murder. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10 at ¶¶55-56.
It follows from this that, if this Court concludes that the felony discharge convictions
merge with the attempted murder conviction, the Court should vacate the felony discharge
convictions.
CONCLUSION
Where there was but one general intent by the Defendant, and proof of the attempted murder
necessarily proved felony discharge, and, after convicting the Defendant of attempted murder, the jury
did not have to find an additional element to convict him of felony discharge of a firearm, this Court
should find that the convictions for felony discharge merge with the attempted murder and vacate the
convictions.

Respectfully submitted this 13th day of March, 2017.

/s/ Wesley J. Howard
______________________________________
WESLEY J. HOWARD
Attorney for Defendant
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MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake District Attorney’s
Office, via the court’s electronic filing system, this 13th day of March, 2017.
Stacie Misner
__________________________________________
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1

March 23, 2017

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

* * *

4

THE COURT: All right. This is case No. 1614000285.

5

That's the case that we're here for sentencing on today. I see

6

there's been a motion filed by the Defense. The State's filed

7

in opposition of that motion. We have other cases that are

8

trailing. Where would you like to start? Makes sense to argue

9

the motion first?

10

MR. HOWARD: Deal with the motion first.

11

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Howard.

12

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, Mr. Bowden has been

13

convicted of attempted aggravated murder. And I did notice in

14

my, my memorandum that I misspoke saying that all of the felony

15

charges were necessary for committing Count 1. That's

16

certainly not true of theft -- receipt of a stolen vehicle and

17

obstruction of justice. But in regard to the five counts of

18

felony discharge of a firearm, the -- Count 1 could not stand

19

without conviction or finding of guilt in those five instances.

20

The -- they're prerequisite to attempted aggravated

21

murder that the State proved that some action was taken by the

22

party, Mr. Bowden in this case, to attempt to take the life of

23

another person. If he had never fired a gun, there would be no

24

Count 1. That's why those five charges should merge into Count

25

1, the attempted murder charge.
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549
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1

The State makes reference to State v. Rasabout which

2

is a case that has some interesting parallels with this case,

3

but there are also some significant differences. The main

4

difference is as -- and I couldn't, from reading the opinion, I

5

could not see that Mr. Rasabout was ever charged with any other

6

charges other than the firing of the firearm at a house and

7

car. But the defendant in that case was asking the court to

8

merge all of those single incidences of firing a gun into one,

9

all of which had the same elements, all of which were the same

10

charge.

11

In this case, Mr. Bowden is asking the Court not to

12

merge four of the counts into one but to merge the five felony

13

discharge of a firearm into the Count No. 1, the attempted

14

murder. And that's a significant difference because there's

15

no -- in the Rasabout case, there's no higher degree of felony

16

into which those 12 discharges can be merged. They each stood

17

alone.

18

Now, the State may want to try to pick one of those

19

of the five firings that were -- Mr. Bowden is convicted of.

20

May want to pick one of those and say, oh, that's the one where

21

he intended to kill Officer Tsouras. But there's no logical or

22

factual basis to support that supposition. It's -- it's purely

23

a supposition if you put -- pick one bullet over the other one.

24
25

The theory of the State is that Mr. Bowden fired
his -- a firearm at Officer Tsouras with the intent to kill
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1

him. And they -- they are not free to choose which bullet or

2

which firing or the order in which they were fired to determine

3

which one was an attempt to kill Officer Tsouras and then

4

dismiss the others as incidental.

5

And so we would ask the Court to dismiss the five

6

counts of felony discharge of a firearm, merge them into Count

7

1, the aggravated murder.

8

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Howard.

9

Mr. Evershed.

10

MR. EVERSHED: Yes, your Honor. There were six shots

11

towards the officer's car. Therefore, we had six counts. We

12

had an attempted aggravated murder, and we have five counts of

13

felony discharge of a firearm. So each of those counts

14

represent under Rasabout a single unit of prosecution. Under

15

Rasabout, 12 shots were fired. The trial court merged all of

16

them down to one, but then the Utah Supreme Court said, no,

17

these are individual units of prosecution. Each one is a --

18

each discreet shot is a violation of the statute.

19

So that's how we went forward on the case: Six

20

shots, six charges, one attempted aggravated murder, five a

21

discharge of a firearm, felony discharge of a firearm.

22

The Defense argues merger, but again under Rasabout,

23

that does not -- that's not allowed. Double jeopardy is not

24

implicated. Again, these are six individual counts and shots.

25

And finally, the single criminal episode I stated, Rasabout was
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1

also inapplicable, because again we have six individual counts.

2

The State didn't offer an alternative approach,

3

however, in reviewing the PowerPoint presentation and the

4

closing argument that was proffered before the jury. I did see

5

in our argument, again, the shot that was -- that went to the

6

vest was the attempted aggravated murder, which is argued as

7

such.

8

And then the shot that was -- that went through the

9

headrest, again, that was used in closing argument as well,

10

these are proofs of, you know, attempted aggravated murder.

11

But then we have other shots. One that went up over

12

by the tire, the roof of the car, two others that we don't know

13

where they hit. Those are separate and distinct units of

14

prosecution. And so as an alternative approach, if your Honor

15

wanted to merge the two that nearly killed the man into

16

attempted aggravated murder, and then we have the other, what

17

would be the remaining four counts of felony discharge of a

18

firearm, again single units of prosecution under Rasabout, the

19

State is okay with that compromise here. But for those

20

reasons, not much more -- no more of a merger than that should

21

occur in this case.

22

The defendant fired six shots. He did indicate --

23

and again, the theory, and this was under Rasabout which, you

24

know, I'm -- I'm familiar with. Under Rasabout, the argument

25

to the court, I know the court was addressing, is there is a
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1

difference here. In that when you fire 12 shots at a home,

2

that's different than three. Obviously, the -- the likelihood

3

somebody would be injured, something devastating happening

4

arises exponentially with each shot. And so that individual

5

should, and rightly, be punished, and the State is right in

6

prosecuting that. If we just had two shots here, there could

7

be an argument.

8
9

THE COURT: Essentially, the difference between
unloading an entire magazine into a home --

10

MR. EVERSHED: Right.

11

THE COURT: -- versus firing a single shot?

12

MR. EVERSHED: Firing a single shot. Yes. And so

13

one should be prosecuted rightfully because of that, because of

14

the risk. In this case, if -- if the defendant shot two rounds

15

at Officer Tsouras and one hit the vest and one hit the

16

headrest, that's -- that could be attempted aggravated murder,

17

which is what we would argue, and maybe that's it.

18

But in this case he did more than that. And he

19

should be punished and prosecuted -- well, he was prosecuted

20

but convicted and then punished for everything he did, not

21

more, not less, but for everything he did and what he was

22

convicted of. And I think that's the argument there.

23

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

24

Anything further, Mr. Howard, on that, on that issue?

25

MR. HOWARD: Yes, your Honor. I just don't think the
Noteworthy Reporting, LLC (801) 634-5549

7

1371

1

State can properly parse it out that way and determine which

2

shots had a particular intent. It comes down to marksmanship

3

by the theory just presented. If a -- if Mr. Bowden had fired

4

one shot and completely missed the vehicle, or if he had fired

5

a shot and hit the vehicle but nowhere near Officer Tsouras,

6

you can still bet that the State would have still filed

7

attempted aggravated murder charges. So marksmanship should

8

not be the determining factor here. Because Mr. Bowden was

9

lucky or a good marksman or for whatever reason, one of them

10

came dangerously close to taking Officer Tsouras's life, you

11

can't logically determine that that was the bullet where he

12

intended to kill the officer.

13

THE COURT: And Mr. Howard, your argument here

14

distinguishing between this case and Rasabout is in Rasabout

15

there wasn't a more serious lead count that was charged. It

16

was just the discharge.

17

MR. HOWARD: Exactly each count.

18

THE COURT: In this case we have, we have an

19
20

attempted homicide and that -- that's the difference.
MR. HOWARD: Each count had identical elements to be

21

proven for each of those 12 shots. In this case, Count 1

22

needed to be the firing of the firearm in order to be supported

23

and to be -- to have a conviction in front of the jury. It's

24

unsupportable without those shots being fired.

25

Now -- and then my point is that you can't parse it
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1

out and say shot No. 1 or 3 or 5 is the one that hit the

2

headrest or hit the protected vest and the others are just

3

incidental and, therefore, should be charged separately and

4

should be punished separately. But they all were in support of

5

under the State's theory, an intent to kill Officer Tsouras.

6

MR. EVERSHED: And what I would say in response again

7

in Rasabout, there's no distinction. There's nothing under the

8

law that says, well, if there's a more serious offense, then

9

there's some kind of distinction. No.

10

In Rasabout they just say, are there individual units

11

of prosecution? That's what it comes down to. And the State's

12

theory here is that, yes, there are. One count, attempted

13

murder, five counts felony discharge, six bullets.

14

THE COURT: Right.

15

MR. EVERSHED: Now if there is a compromise there,

16

maybe one of them could merge and, again, that's just if.

17

Again, the State's response is all of them should be separate

18

and distinct.

19

THE COURT: Right. But in -- just for the purpose of

20

argument here to Mr. Howard's point, if there had been only

21

four shots, we take away the one that hit the vest and the one

22

that hit the headrest, the State still would have charged the

23

lead count as it was charged and now it would have been what,

24

the next closest bullet?

25

MR. EVERSHED: Well, I think -- again, these are all
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1

hypotheticals, but what could have happened in that case is

2

that obviously that's a more difficult case to prove of

3

attempted aggravated murder. We don't have bullets going right

4

toward his head and chest.

5

THE COURT: I certainly don't think it would be a

6

stretch to say the State brought a case with a guy running in a

7

moving car and shots fired into the car, that that was

8

attempted homicide.

9

MR. EVERSHED: Yes, that could have been a theory.

10

But again, if that's one unit of prosecution, one bullet that

11

goes towards him, then the State could only go with attempted

12

aggravated murder or with felony discharge. What makes this

13

case different from that hypothetical is that there wasn't one,

14

there wasn't two, there were six.

15

THE COURT: Right.

16

MR. EVERSHED: And this man should face the

17

convictions of all of those six individual things that

18

happened. Just because he didn't fire fine and he shouldn't be

19

punished for having eight, he should be punished and face what

20

he did do, and that's six individual firings of a firearm.

21

And so the question is: Can the State charge him

22

like that? Yes. There are six distinct things that happened.

23

He pulled that trigger six different times, not two, not 10,

24

but six, and he should face what he needs to face because of

25

that.
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1

THE COURT: Okay.

2

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, treating them as separate

3

prosecuted -- prosecutable units leads a person to believe that

4

the State, therefore, since all six of these shots were fired

5

at the officer, that the State could have charged attempted

6

aggravated murder six times rather than -- rather than

7

discharge of a firearm, felony discharge of a firearm. They

8

could have charged attempted aggravated murder six times, but

9

that obviously would have merged into one. They are attempting

10

to avoid the merger issue by parsing out one bullet that has

11

the intent to kill, the other bullets just bad shooting.

12

MR. EVERSHED: No, what our intent is here, is,

13

again, this isn't marksmanship, this isn't anything else other

14

than what we can legally in law do. We can charge this man

15

with what he did. And then a jury can decide if we've proved

16

it.

17

In this case, the jury didn't say not guilty, not

18

anything. They said guilty as charged. So the question is

19

here is that do these things merge? And the arguments have

20

been, well, they are all part of one thing. No, they are all

21

individual, different counts, all separate units of

22

prosecution. Under Rasabout, it's absolutely clear, we can

23

charge an individual with what he has done, with each crime

24

that he has committed. In this case he did six of them.

25

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Um, the way it was
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1

charged, the State used one of the discharges that went towards

2

the attempted aggravated murder which was charged in Count 1.

3

The State in its memoranda has offered an alternative, which is

4

to say because they've argued and they've reviewed the argument

5

that was made at closing argument, that there were two shots

6

and that's the way they argued it, that they agree that it's

7

arguable that one of these counts should be vacated.

8

I'm going to vacate one of the counts at this point

9

in time based upon the memoranda that has been filed, and I'm

10
11

going to agree with the State on that point.
I think another court may take another view of this

12

and it may be that they agree with Mr. Howard's argument in

13

totality, that that wasn't the intent of Rasabout or that case;

14

however, at this point in time, I'm going to vacate one count.

15

So that leaves us with Count 1, attempted aggravated murder;

16

Count 2, receipt or transfer of stolen vehicle; Count 3,

17

obstructing justice; and then one, two, three, four felony

18

discharge of a firearm counts. So I've granted in part the

19

Defense's motion but only in part.

20

MR. EVERSHED: And then, your Honor, there is also --

21

THE COURT: And then the failure to stop at the

22

command of a law enforcement officer, which should that be --

23

at this point should that be renumbered or do we skip?

24
25

MR. EVERSHED: I think -- I think we could just
strike what would be, I think, Count 9, dismiss that.
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ADDENDUM E

Utah Code § 76-4-101 (2015)
§ 76-4-101. Attempt--Elements of offense

(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the
crime; and
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he acts with an
awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it strongly
corroborates the actor’s mental state as defined in Subsection (1)(b).
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been committed if
the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed them to be.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-4-101; Laws 2004, c. 154, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004.

Utah Code § 76-5-202 (2015)
§ 76-5-202. Aggravated murder

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or
knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
(a) the homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or other
correctional institution;
(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed, or during which the
actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the victim who was killed;
(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim
and the actor;
(d) the homicide was committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit
aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child,
forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child,
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, child abuse as defined in Subsection
76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated
burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, or child kidnapping;
(e) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or
criminal episode during which the actor committed the crime of abuse or desecration
of a dead human body as defined in Subsection 76-9-704(2)(e);
(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of
the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority or for
the purpose of effecting the defendant’s or another’s escape from lawful custody;
(g) the homicide was committed for pecuniary gain;
(h) the defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person to commit the
homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of
remuneration for commission of the homicide;
(i) the actor previously committed or was convicted of:
(i) aggravated murder under this section;
(ii) attempted aggravated murder under this section;
(iii) murder, Section 76-5-203;
(iv) attempted murder, Section 76-5-203; or
(v) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state
would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(i);
(j) the actor was previously convicted of:
(i) aggravated assault, Subsection 76-5-103(2);
(ii) mayhem, Section 76-5-105;
(iii) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301;
(iv) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;
(v) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302;

(vi) rape, Section 76-5-402;
(vii) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(viii) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;
(ix) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;
(x) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403;
(xi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;
(xii) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1;
(xiii) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;
(xiv) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103;
(xv) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203;
(xvi) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302;
(xvii) felony discharge of a firearm, Section 76-10-508.1; or
(xviii) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state
would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(j);
(k) the homicide was committed for the purpose of:
(i) preventing a witness from testifying;
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in any legal
proceedings or official investigation;
(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating
in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or
(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of
laws;
(l) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a candidate for
public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official
position, act, capacity, or candidacy;
(m) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, executive
officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge or other court
official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is either on duty or
the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the
actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or has held that
official position;
(n) the homicide was committed:
(i) by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar
device which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling,
building, or structure, or was mailed or delivered; or
(ii) by means of any weapon of mass destruction as defined in Section 76-10-401;
(o) the homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any
aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of threats or force with intent to
obtain any valuable consideration for the release of the public conveyance or any
passenger, crew member, or any other person aboard, or to direct the route or
movement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public
conveyance;
(p) the homicide was committed by means of the administration of a poison or of any
lethal substance or of any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or
quantity;
(q) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, hostage, or for

ransom;
(r) the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or
exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical
torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death;
(s) the actor dismembers, mutilates, or disfigures the victim’s body, whether before or
after death, in a manner demonstrating the actor’s depravity of mind; or
(t) the victim, at the time of the death of the victim:
(i) was younger than 14 years of age; and
(ii) was not an unborn child.
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor, with reckless
indifference to human life, causes the death of another incident to an act, scheme,
course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor is a major participant in
the commission or attempted commission of:
(a) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a);
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;
(c) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;
(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;
(e) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; or
(f) sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1.
(3)(a) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is
a capital felony.
(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, aggravated
murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section
76-3-207.7.
(c)(i) Within 60 days after arraignment of the defendant, the prosecutor may file
notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice shall be served on the defendant
or defense counsel and filed with the court.
(ii) Notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be served and filed more than 60
days after the arraignment upon written stipulation of the parties or upon a finding
by the court of good cause.
(d) Without the consent of the prosecutor, the court may not accept a plea of guilty to
noncapital first degree felony aggravated murder during the period in which the
prosecutor may file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty under Subsection
(3)(c)(i).
(e) If the defendant was younger than 18 years of age at the time the offense was
committed, aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as
provided in Section 76-3-207.7.
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder or attempted
aggravated murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to
cause the death of another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a
legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined

from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) aggravated murder to murder; and
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted murder.
(5)(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a
separate offense does not merge with the crime of aggravated murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of aggravated murder, based on an aggravating
circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense,
may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense.
Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-201; Laws 1975, c. 53, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 83, § 1; Laws 1983, c.
88, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 93, § 1; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 16, § 1; Laws 1991, c.
10, § 8; Laws 1994, c. 149, § 1; Laws 1996, c. 137, § 3, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c.
11, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 90, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2000, c. 125, § 2,
eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 9, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 166, § 4, eff.
May 6, 2002; Laws 2005, c. 143, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 2006, c. 191, § 1, eff. May 1,
2006; Laws 2007, c. 275, § 3, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 340, § 1, eff. April 30,
2007; Laws 2007, c. 345, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2008, c. 12, § 2, eff. Feb. 26,
2008; Laws 2009, c. 157, § 2, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2009, c. 206, § 1, eff. May 12,
2009; Laws 2010, c. 13, § 2, eff. March 8, 2010; Laws 2010, c. 373, § 2, eff. May 11,
2010; Laws 2013, c. 81, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013.

Utah Code § 76-8-306 (2015)
§ 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice in criminal investigations or proceedings
--Elements--Penalties--Exceptions

(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or
prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any
person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense:
(a) provides any person with a weapon;
(b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from performing any act
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or
punishment of any person;
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing;
(d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false;
(e) harbors or conceals a person;
(f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding
discovery or apprehension;
(g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension;
(h) warns any person of an order authorizing the interception of wire
communications or of a pending application for an order authorizing the interception
of wire communications;
(i) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a
judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or
(j) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting
an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation.
(2)(a) As used in this section, “conduct that constitutes a criminal offense” means
conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this
section, and includes:
(i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political
subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of the United
States; and
(ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an
adult.
(b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States, is a:
(i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment
without parole;
(ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with
parole or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years;
(iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years;
(iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any
period exceeding one year; and

(v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period of
one year or less.
(3) Obstruction of justice is:
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a
capital felony or first degree felony;
(b) a third degree felony if:
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree felony
and the actor violates Subsection (1)(b), (c), (d), (e), or (f);
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a
capital or first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (1)(a);
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or
(iv) a violation of Subsection (1)(h); or
(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated
under Subsection (3)(a) or (b).
(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct
constituting an offense.
(5) Subsection (1)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed by
Section 62A-7-402.
(6) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply to:
(a) tampering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508.5;
(b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-316;
(c) tampering with a witness or soliciting or receiving a bribe, which is governed by
Section 76-8-508;
d) retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant, which is governed by Section
76-8-508.3; or
(e) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed by
Section 76-8-509.
(7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony if
the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has escaped from official custody as
defined in Section 76-8-309.

Credits
Laws 2001, c. 209, § 10, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2001, c. 307, § 2, eff. April 30, 2001;
Laws 2003, c. 179, § 1; Laws 2004, c. 140, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2004, c. 240, § 3,
eff. March 22, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 13, § 27, eff. March 1, 2005; Laws 2009, c. 213, § 1,
eff. May 12, 2009.

Utah Code § 76-10-508.1 (2015)
§ 76-10-508.1. Felony discharge of a firearm--Penalties

(1) Except as provided under Subsection (2) or (3), a person who discharges a firearm is
guilty of a third degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than
three years nor more than five years if:
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, knowing
or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered by the discharge of
the firearm;
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a
habitable structure as defined in Section 76-6-101, discharges a firearm in the
direction of any person or habitable structure; or
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a firearm in the
direction of any vehicle.
(2) A violation of Subsection (1) which causes bodily injury to any person is a second
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of not less than three years nor
more than 15 years.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1) which causes serious bodily injury to any person is a
first degree felony.
(4) In addition to any other penalties for a violation of this section, the court shall:
(a) notify the Driver License Division of the conviction for purposes of any
revocation, denial, suspension, or disqualification of a driver license under
Subsection 53-3-220(1)(a)(xi); and
(b) specify in court at the time of sentencing the length of the revocation under
Subsection 53-3-225(1)(c).
(5) This section does not apply to a person:
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful defense of self or
others;
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Section 23-20-1.5 or Subsections
76-10-523 (1)(a) through (e) or as otherwise authorized by law; or
(c) who discharges a dangerous weapon or firearm from an automobile or other
vehicle, if:
(i) the discharge occurs at a firing range or training ground;
(ii) at no time after the discharge does the projectile that is discharged cross over or
stop at a location other than within the boundaries of the firing range or training
ground described in Subsection (5)(c)(i);
(iii) the discharge is made as practice or training for a lawful purpose;

(iv) the discharge and the location, time, and manner of the discharge are approved
by the owner or operator of the firing range or training ground prior to the
discharge; and
(v) the discharge is not made in violation of Subsection (1).
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 296, § 4, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 157, § 4, eff. May 12, 2009;
Laws 2014, c. 248, § 3, eff. May 13, 2014.

Utah Code § 76-1-401
§ 76-1-401. “Single criminal episode” defined--Joinder of offenses and defendants

In this part unless the context requires a different definition, “single criminal episode”
means all conduct which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section 77-8a-1 in
controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal proceedings.

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-401; Laws 1975, c. 47, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 127, eff. May 1,
1995.

Utah Code § 76-1-402
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode--Included
offenses
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under
only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such
provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode,
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is
arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so
included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish
the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.

(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction
may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-1-402; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 2.

Utah R. Evid. 401
Rule 401. Test for Relevant Evidence
Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

Utah R. Evid. 402
Rule 402. General Admissibility of Relevant Evidence
Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
●
●
●
●

the United States Constitution;
the Utah Constitution;
a statute; or
rules applicable in courts of this state.

Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.

Utah R. Evid. 403
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion,
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for
exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in
Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that
a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing
with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex.
1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d
1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

